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THE PEOPLE MADE ME DO IT: CAN THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATES INSTRUCT AND COERCE THEIR STATE
LEGISLATURES IN THE ARTICLE V CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT PROCESS?
VIERAM DAVID AMAR*
INTRODUCTION
For me, there is no place more exciting than California.
Where else can you find earthquakes, mudslides, internet boom
and bust stories, and Jerry Brown back in politics? Amid all this
unpredictability, however, it is nice to know that some constants
remain. For instance, one thing you can always count on in the
Golden State is that every year the voters will enact an initia-
tive that gets struck down in court. And this last year was no
exception. In 1998, California voters enacted Proposition 225,1 a
fascinating law that implicates a host of deep constitutional
issues-namely, federalism, popular sovereignty, congressional
term limits, and the federal constitutional amendment process.
As expected, last summer the California Supreme Court invali-
dated the measure as violating Article V of the United States
Constitution.2
But this past year's story did not fit the usual mold in two
ways. First, unlike other California propositions of recent years,
Proposition 225 was not on the cutting edge. Voters in a number
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B.,
University of California at Berkeley, 1985; J.D., Yale Law School, 1988. I wish to
thank Dipanwita Amar, Akhil Amar, Larry Tribe, Jesse Choper, Walter Dellinger,
Elizabeth Garrett, Bruce Cain, Mike Paulsen, David Levine, Bill Wang, David Jung,
Evan Lee, Calvin Massey, Joe Grodin, Reuel Schiller, David Reis, Joel Paul, Ash
Bhagwat, Alan Brownstein, Jim Pfander, Eugene Volokh, and participants in the
University of illinois College of Law Faculty Workshop Series for their input on
earlier versions of this Essay. Special thanks are owed to Evan Caminker, with
whom I was originally planning to co-write this Essay. Many of the best ideas in
this piece are Evan's as much as mine.
1. See Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240 app. at 1252-57 (Cal. 1999) (providing
the text of the proposed law).
2. See id. at 1241, 1251-52.
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of other states had already enacted measures virtually identical
to Proposition 225,S and at least six other state and federal
courts had struck these measures down as violating Article V.4
And so, this Essay really concerns the constitutionality of a
nationwide movement of which California's experience is but one
small part. Second, unlike many other popular referendums, this
time it has been the reviewing courts, and not the voting public,
who have ignored constitutional first principles. The short of it
is that judges all across the country have gotten things funda-
mentally wrong here, and that ballot measures like Proposition
225 that have been passed nationwide are not unconstitutional,
or at least not unconstitutional for the reasons that have been
given.
To see this, let us start with what Proposition 225 and its
counterparts in other states do. This requires that we go back to
the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton,5 in which the Court held that neither state govern-
ments nor Congress can impose congressional term limits under
our existing Constitution.6 If such term limits are to come about,
the Thornton Court made clear that they require an amendment
of the Constitution through Article V.7 Backers of Proposition
3. For a discussion of the measures enacted in Nebraska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Maine, and Oklahoma, see Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (8th Cir. 1999);
League of Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52, 53-55 (D. Me. 1997); Dono-
van v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 119-24 (Ark. 1996); Morrissey v. Colorado, 951 P.2d
911, 913-14 & app. B at 919 (Colo. 1998); Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d 693,
694-98 (Me. 1996); In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186, 186-91 (Okla.
1996).
4. Measures similar to Proposition 225 have been struck down in the states of
Nebraska, Colorado, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Maine. See, e.g., Miller, 169 F.3d at
1121-22; Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. at 53-55; Donovan, 931 S.W.2d at 119-24;
Morrissey, 951 P.2d at 913-14; Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d at 694-98; Initiative
Petition, 930 P.2d at 188-91; see also AFL-CIO v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1984) (in-
validating earlier measure on the same grounds used to invalidate Proposition 225);
Simpson v. Cenarrusa, 944 P.2d 1372 (Idaho 1997) (invalidating measure similar to
Proposition 225 on other grounds); State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826
(Mont. 1984) (invalidating state initiative for balanced budget amendment on the
same grounds as Proposition 225).
5. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
6. See id. at 827.
7. See id. at 837 ("Any [congressional term limit] must come not by legislation
adopted either by Congress or by an individual State, but rather-as have other
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225, working with similar groups in other states, have tried to
move things along in that direction by enacting in each state a
plebiscitary initiative. Each initiative, among other things, "in-
structs" state and federal legislators in that state to pursue the
Article V amendment process by proposing, supporting, and rati-
fying a federal term limits amendment, a template version of
which is included in the initiative measure.' If a legislator fails
to take any of a number of defined steps along the Article V
proposal and ratification path, the initiative provides that a
"scarlet letter"9 designation be placed on the next election ballot
-indicating that the individual legislator has "DISREGARDED
VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS."10
As indicated above, lower courts-most recently the California
Supreme Court-uniformly have invalidated these measures.
11
The gist of these decisions is that scarlet letters and related
devices are coercive and that such coercion violates Article V of
the United States Constitution.' According to these decisions,
Article V requires that state legislatures be free and indepen-
dent to make their own decisions through their own deliberative
processes when deciding whether to seek and/or ratify federal
constitutional amendments.
This logic has a certain appeal these days. A recent and very
prominent line of federalism decisions-the so-called state-com-
mandeering or state-conscription cases like New York v. United
important changes in the electoral process-through the amendment procedures set
forth in Article V." (footnote omitted)).
8. The template amendment provides that "[n]o person may serve in the office of
U.S. Representative for more than three terms [and no] person may serve in the of-
fice of U.S. Senator for more than two terms." Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240,
1254 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Proposition 225).
9. This is my term, not one used in any initiative.
10. Bramberg, 978 P.2d at 1254 (quoting Proposition 225).
11. See supra note 4.
12. See, e.g., Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1122-24 (8th Cir. 1999); League of
Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52, 54-62 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan v.
Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 122-28 (Ark. 1996); Bramberg, 978 P.2d at 1246-52;
Morrissey v. Colorado, 951 P.2d 911, 913-17 (Colo. 1998); Opinion of the Justices,
673 A.2d 693, 696 (Me. 1996); In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186, 191-93
(Okla. 1996).
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States13 and United States v. Printz'4 --might be read as creating
a deliberative autonomy enjoyed by state institutions, especially
state legislatures, when they carry out their duties. It would be
tempting to connect the dots from all these cases and derive a
general principle of legislative autonomy and immunity from
coercion and conscription. In the end, however, I think the state-
conscription cases involve a very different situation-that of the
federal government coercing state legislatures-from the scarlet-
letter-device cases. When the people of a state, the masters of
their legislature, if you will, engage in such coercion, no federal
constitutional value is offended. 5 Of course, Thornton and other
constitutional developments tell us that the people of each state
are not the masters of the national legislature, Congress. 6 For
that reason, although the reviewing courts have not drawn a
distinction between the two sets of government agents, scarlet
letters imposed on federal legislators may be impermissible"
even though they are quite allowable for their state counter-
parts. 8 I will return to the question of coercing federal legisla-
tors a bit later.
But let us begin by focusing on scarlet letters that are im-
posed upon state legislators. My discussion assumes that scarlet
letter devices really are, as lower courts have held them to be,
"coercive," rather than "informational." 9 Indeed, my argument is
that nothing in Article V prohibits coercive action by the people
13. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
14. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
15. Indeed, as I suggest below, when the federal Constitution is used to interfere
with the power the people of each state enjoy to structure their state government in
ways they see fit, constitutional values of federalism are compromised. See infra
notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
16. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806-27 (1995); infra
notes 45-66 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Gralike v. Cook, 996 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
18. To say that scarlet letters are allowable under Article V is not, of course, to
say they are wise. I express no view in this Essay on the wisdom of using scarlet
letters and other coercive measures to push along the Article V amendment process.
Nor do I express any view on the wisdom of congressional term limits.
19. Because of the crucial time at which voters would see the ballot designa-
tions-the moment at which they cast their ballots--scarlet letters are obviously
more influential than, say, political advertising. Whether they are "coercive" depends
on what we mean by that term and is a difficult, but ultimately irrelevant, question.
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of a state against its legislature. Thus, my Article V analysis
would be no different if the people of the several states, instead
of adopting a scarlet letter approach, had gone even "further" by
backing up their instructions to their state legislative contin-
gents by imposing on those legislators who disregarded the pop-
ular directives a flat ineligibility to seek reelection.
My inquiry into these matters proceeds as follows. In Part I of
this Essay, I open the analysis of coercive measures against
state legislators by focusing on the text of Article V, particularly
its reference to "Legislatures of... the... States."20 I conclude
that the term, used against the historical backdrop of state con-
stitutions in 1787, was not designed to interfere with the preex-
isting control that people enjoyed over their state legislatures. I
then reinforce this textual/historical reading with compelling
structural and practical arguments. Most importantly, I argue
that the structural concern over governmental self-dealing coun-
sels against reading Article V as giving a veto over constitution-
al change to government actors.2 I conclude Part I by analyzing
other places in which the Constitution has empowered "Legisla-
tures of... the... States" and concluding that these other
provisions of the Constitution further undermine the reading of
Article V that courts across the nation have embraced.
In Part , I explain why Article V uses the term "Legislatures
of... the... States" rather than "states," the more generic
term used elsewhere in the Constitution. In Part HI, I consider
possible counterarguments to my reading of Article V, including
some based on old Supreme Court cases and others based on
structural constitutional themes. In Part IV, I quickly dispose of
the issue bracketed above-the application of coercive measures
to federal legislators. I then conclude by suggesting that there
may be some additional constitutional questions that need to be
asked about scarlet letter and other coercive measures-ques-
tions that have nothing to do with any Article V reasoning em-
braced to date.22
20. U.S. CONST. art. V.
21. My treatment of structural considerations in this Part also includes an analy-
sis of the "Republican Guarantee Clause." See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying
text.
22. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. These last comments are tentative
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I. WHY ARTICLE V CAN'T MEAN WHAT THEY SAY IT MEANS
A. Text and History
Article V of the Constitution has received more scholarly at-
tention in the past few decades than ever before.2" Much of this
recent and needed' attention has focused on whether Article V
is the exclusive lawful means of federal constitutional amend-
ment. Those who say that Article V is not the exclusive means of
amending the Constitution argue that the national polity is
sovereign under American constitutional theory, and that a
majority of this national polity enjoys the constitutional right to
amend the document through deliberative means, whether or
not these means meet the requirements of Article V.25 Those
who support the conventional view that Article V is completely
exclusive reject the idea that ultimate sovereignty resides com-
pletely in a majority of the national people. Instead, these schol-
ars argue that Article V reflects a federalism compromise in
which people of each state surrendered some of their sovereignty
in 1787 as the price to pay for ratifying the Constitution. How-
and will be elaborated in a future essay. See Vikram David Amar & Alan
Brownstein, Scarlet Letters and Constitutional Limits on Ways to Structure Ballots
(forthcoming).
23. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,
93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed. Constitu-
tional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994); David R. Dow,
When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (1990); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People(s), Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 121 (1996).
24. I say academic attention is needed because there are so many unresolved
questions concerning Article V, see Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting
Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amend-
ment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627 (1979), and because Article V was invoked often-a dozen
times-during the last 90 years. Compare that to the complete absence of Article V
amendments, not counting the Reconstruction amendments (which were legally and
historically anomalous) for the 109 years between 1804 and 1913. Moreover, people
today seem to be making more and more calls to amend the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Senator Dianne Feinstein, For the Victims, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1999, at A16 (argu-
ing in favor of proposed Victims' Rights Amendment); David E. Rosenbaum, Stars,
Stripes, Flames and Free Speech Redux, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1999, at All (discuss-
ing the perennial debate over the proposed flag-burning amendment).
25. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991); 2
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 15-17 (1998); Amar, supra
note 23, at 488-94.
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ever, because of mistrust of other state peoples, they did so only
on the condition that future changes to the Constitution would
comply with Article V's particular and cumbersome processes.26
Thus, the scholarly debate on Article V exclusivity thus far has
focused on the relationship between the national polity and state
polities, as well as the relationship between the peoples of the
various states. But the important and separate matter of the
relationship under Article V between the people of each state
and their elected legislators has received no academic attention
until this Essay. Even as I examine this last question, though, I
should note that my resolution of it is not unrelated to the way
the exclusivity question has been decided. Indeed, as I demon-
strate below, the conventional reading of Article V exclusivi-
ty-embraced by most commentators as well as all courts
-counsels strongly in favor of my resolution of the question of
popular coercion. With that background, let us turn in earnest
to the popular coercion question.
Any assessment of the constitutionality under Article V of
coercion of state legislatures must, of course, consider the text of
Article V itself, which provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Consti-
tution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when rat-
ified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the
Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without
26. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 23; Tribe, supra note 24, at 632-37 (discussing
the compromise present in the Article V Convention); see also Douglas iUnder, What
in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 720 (1981) (describ-
ing some of the Framers' intentional efforts to make the amendment process difficult
in anticipation of state subversion).
27. See infra notes 71-101 and accompanying text.
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its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate.
Article V sets out two paths to proposing amendments, con-
gressional proposal or a proposing convention, and two paths to
ratifying them, through state legislatures or, at Congress's elec-
tion, through state conventions. Article V thus refers to 'Legisla-
tures... of the... States," and "Conventions in... the States,"
but not-at least not explicitly-to the people of the states.9
"Legislature," the argument against coercive measures like Prop-
osition 225 runs, is a term of art. Use of the term "legislature"
creates a nondelegable power on the part of elected representa-
tive legislatures. "Legislatures" means legislatures, not conven-
tions, -and certainly not the people of each state themselves.
This textual argument is expressed quite directly in the
eighty-year-old United States Supreme Court opinion in Hawke
v. Smith,30 a decision heavily relied upon in recent lower court
rulings"' and one that I will take up in more detail in Part
III.A.12 In Hawke, the Court invoked Article V in refusing to en-
force an Ohio constitutional provision that recognized the power
of the people of Ohio to reverse, by referendum, decisions to
ratify proposed federal amendments made by the state legisla-
ture."3 In broad language, the Hawke Court observed:
What did the framers of the Constitution mean in requiring
[in Article VI ratification by "legislatures?" That was not a
term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Con-
stitution. What it meant when adopted it still means for the
purpose of interpretation. A Legislature was then the repre-
sentative body which made the laws of the people.... There
can be no question that the framers of the Constitution clearly
understood and carefully used the terms in which that in-
strument referred to the action of the Legislatures of the
28. U.S. CONST. art. V.
29. Id.
30. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
31. See, e.g., Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 1999); Gralike v. Cook, 996
F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo. 1998); Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119 (Ark. 1996);
Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1999).
32. See infra notes 153-86 and accompanying text.
33. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 227.
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States. When they intended that direct action by the people
should be had they were no less accurate in the use of apt
phraseology to carry out such purpose.34
At first glance, this textual argument has some surface plausi-
bility. We all instinctively think, and throughout American his-
tory have thought, that there is a difference between the people
and a legislature. We also presume that the Framers of the
Constitution chose their words carefully. On more thorough re-
flection, however, analysis of the textual term "Legislatures
of... the... States" supports rather than undermines mea-
sures like Proposition 225. To begin with, in all the lower court
cases construing scarlet letter devices, it is the legislatures that
are coerced into doing the applying.15 The legislatures may not
like what they are being forced to do, to be sure, but they are
still the ones acting. There is an obvious sense, therefore, in
which the scarlet letter devices comply with the text of Article V
completely.
36
This may seem too formalist for some readers, however. 7 If
the people are forcing the issue, then, in reality, it is the people
rather than the legislature making the key decisions and exer-
cising the power. This recognition brings us to the heart of the
textual argument-the idea that as a matter of text, real power
must reside in an "independent legislature," and cannot be
transferred to someone or something else. It is at this point,
however, that the textual argument seems to go beyond the text
itself. Of course, the text does refer to state legislatures, but it
nowhere explicitly says that state legislatures means legisla-
tures free to act according to their discretion---"independent
legislatures"--as opposed to legislatures typically guided and
even bound by their creators and masters-the state peoples.
34. Id. at 227-28.
35. See, e.g., Miller, 169 F.3d at 1119; League of Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966
F. Supp. 52, 52 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan, 931 S.W.2d at 119; Bramberg, 978 P.2d at
1240; Morrissey v. Colorado, 951 P.2d 911, 911 (Colo. 1998); Opinion of the Justices,
673 A.2d 693, 693 (Me. 1996); In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186, 186
(Okla. 1996).
36. This is a quick and easy way to distinguish Hawke, which involved not coer-
cing, but supplanting, the standing legislature's power. For an even better way to dis-
tinguish Hawke, see infra notes 153-86 and accompanying text.
37. It may be worth pointing out that textualism itself, taken seriously, is too
formalistic for many.
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Perhaps an analogy here will drive home the point I am mak-
ing. There are a lot of interesting connections between various
structural themes of the Constitution, so let us look outside of
Article V to another structural idea: separation of powers, par-
ticularly Article II's Appointments Clause. The Appointments
Clause says: "Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.3 8
Imagine that Congress passed a law vesting appointment power
for an assistant Attorney General in the Attorney General, the
head of the Justice Department. Would anyone argue that the
President does not have the right to coerce the Attorney General,
through threats and imposition of the ultimate sanc-
tion-firing-into appointing the kind of person the President
wants as assistant Attorney General? I think not, even though
the Constitution clearly distinguishes here between the "Presi-
dent" and "Heads of Departments." 9 Most everyone would con-
cede presidential power to coerce here and would not read the
reference to "Heads of Departments" to mean "independent
Heads of Departments." Indeed, at least as it relates to the head
of the Justice Department, the idea of an "independent" depart-
ment head would strike most people as unthinkable. Instead,
under Article II, the President effectively gets to control the
power that the Constitution allows Congress to vest in under-
lings. Why? Because as a backdrop matter of executive power,
he is the underlings' master-their superior. So too, as a back-
drop principle, state people are masters of their legislatures. We
therefore should not read the words of Article V as excluding
popular control, just as we do not read the words of Article II as
excluding presidential control.40
I just described popular control of state legislatures as a back-
drop principle. Where does this principle come from? After all, in
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39. Id.
40. One of the important reasons we do not read Article 11 to forbid presidential
control is the idea of separation of powers. The other great structural theme of the
constitutional design, federalism, similarly counsels against reading Article V to
forbid popular control. See infra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
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the context of the unitary executive, the master/servant relation-
ship between the President and the "Heads of Departments"
comes from our understanding of Article II and the theoretical
background against which it was enacted. My suggestion that
the people are masters of their state legislative servants also
derives from the setting against which the Founders used the
phrase "Legislatures of... the... States."
As the eminent historian Gordon S. Wood has explained, dur-
ing the period between the Revolution and the framing of the
Constitution, "many Americans believed their representatives to
be... mere agents or tools of the people who could give [them]
binding directions ... ." Drawing on ideas from both the great
Whig tradition and people like Locke and Trenchard, American
leaders who shaped political rhetoric and discourse during this
period characterized the relationship between people and their
government in master/servant terms." Moreover, when it came
time to draft new state constitutions to govern the former colo-
nies, Americans built these ideas explicitly into the text of their
new charters. The Virginia Constitution of 1776 was fairly rep-
resentative of others in this regard: it opened by declaring that
"all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the peo-
ple; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all
41. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
371 (1969).
42. See id. at 363-89. Samuel Chase, for example, observed:
From the nature of government by representation, the deputies must be
subject to the will of their principals or this manifest absurdity and plain
consequence must follow, that a few men would be greater than the
whole community, and might act in opposition to the declared sense of
all their constituents.
Id. at 371 (emphasis omitted). Similarly, John Adams noted:
[Representation] is in reality nothing more than this, the people choose
attorneys to vote for them in the great council of the nation, reserving
always the fundamentals of the government, reserving also a right to
give their attorneys instructions how to vote, and a right at certain,
stated intervals, of choosing a-new; discarding an old attorney, and choos-
ing a wiser and better.
John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, in THE WORKS OF JOHN AD-
AMS 477, 481 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1969) (1851); see also DANIEL A. FARBER
& SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 110-11 (1990)
(quoting John Adams and discussing the idea, shared by the Framers, that the gov-
ernment is the servant of the people who are the true arm of government).
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times amenable to them."' As Professors Farber and Sherry
have summarized:
When the American states gained the opportunity [after the
Revolution] to create legislatures more to their liking [than
was Parliament], they implemented many of these ideas. In
1776, [John] Adams again expressed the views of many of his
compatriots when he described the ideal legislature: "It
should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at
large. It should think, feel, reason and act like them." In
order to create such a legislature, and to check the power of
legislators, the new states uniformly established very short
terms of office. Elections for the lower house were held every
year in every state except South Carolina, where they were
held every other year....
Voters in most states also had the right to instruct their
representatives and to direct votes on individual issues.
[Four] state constitutions [explicitly] guaranteed such a right.
In the others, the right was assumed.44
43. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights § 2 (emphasis added), reprinted in 7 THORPE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS, CHARTERS AND ORGANIC LAWS, 1492-1908, at 3813 (1909);
MD. CONST. of 1776, art. V, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra, at 1687 ("[T]he right in
the people to participate in the Legislature is the best security of liberty, and the
foundation of all free government ... ."); MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. V, reprinted in
3 THORPE, supra, at 1890 ("All power residing originally in the people, and being
derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government, vested with
authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents,
and are at all times accountable to them."). For examples of other states, see N.H.
CONST. of 1784, art. VIII, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra, at 2454 ("All power residing
originally in, and being derived from the people, all the magistrates and officers of
government, are their substitutes and agents, and at all times accountable to
them."); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IV, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra, at 3082 ("That
all power being originally inherent in, and consequently derived from, the people;
therefore all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trust-
ees and servants, and at all times accountable to them."). For a good general discus-
sion of these provisions, see John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42
EMORY L.J. 967 (1993).
44. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 42, at 111. The four states whose constitutions
contained explicit instruction language were North Carolina, see N.C. CONST. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, art. II, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 43, at 2787; Penn-
sylvania, see PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVI, reprinted in 5
THORPE, supra note 43, at 3084; Massachusetts, see MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art.
VII, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 43, at 1890; New Hampshire, see N.H.
CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. X, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 43, at 2455. In
addition, the 1777 Constitution of Vermont, which became a state in 1791, contained
1048
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We can see this state constitutional backdrop right to instruct
and control state legislators even more clearly when we examine
how the issues of instruction and control over the newly created
federal legislature were resolved. Shortly after the ratification of
the Constitution, Congress discussed a bill of rights package.45
During that discussion in 1789, a motion was made to include in
what would become the First Amendment a right of the people
"to instruct their representatives."4 This proposal was made in
part because Virginia,47 New York,48 and North Carolina,49 in
ratifying the Constitution, had appended declarations of rights
-constitutional wish lists-that included a right to instruct.50
Ultimately, a congressional committee voted down the language
recognizing a right to instruct,5' and the bill of rights package
that was sent by Congress to the states for ratification made no
mention of instruction. 2
explicit instruction language. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. VI, reprinted in 6
THORPE, supra note 43, at 3740.
A number of commentators, even some who may be disinclined to my bottom
line in this Essay, have commented on the populist nature of state governments in
1787. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503, 1522-26 (1990) (arguing that the Framers designed the federal Constitution to
"filter" out the "excess of populism in the state governments"); Monaghan, supra note
23, at 140, 173 (citing THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
CONVENTION OF 1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 159 (1993) and quoting J. ALLEN
SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 61-62 (Macmillan 1912) (1907) for the
proposition that "the doctrine [was] expressly recognized in some of the states and
virtually in all, that a majority of the qualified voters could amend the fundamental
law"); Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, 'And to the Republic for Which It
Stands": Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1057, 1061-66 (1996) (arguing that the Constitution was a reaction to populism in
state government).
45. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 703 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
46. 1 id. at 733. The context of the proposal made clear it was directed specif-
ically at Congress. Cf Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 249 (1833) (finding that
constitutional amendments afford protection from the federal government, not the
states).
47. See 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 660 (Ayer
1987) (1888) [hereinafter DEBATES].
48. See 1 id. at 328.
49. See 4 id. at 243.
50. See Akbil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Out-
side Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1043, 1059 (1988).
51. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 747.
52. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. I (illustrating that the Constitution protects the rights
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Particularly illuminating for present purposes, however, are
four important features of the debate in Congress over the pro-
posed instruction language. First, although participants in the
congressional discussion debated whether the votes of faithless
federal legislators, that is, legislators who disobeyed their in-
structions, would count if the instruction language were enacted,
there was general agreement that a right to instruct connotes a
right to bind and to sanction disobedience." Second, in response
to suggestions made by opponents of instruction that such a
right had no historical basis, supporters of the right pointed
repeatedly and explicitly to the state constitutional provisions in
three important states-Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
North Carolina-which recognized a right to instruct in a legally
binding way." Third, and related, no instruction opponent, when
confronted with the state constitutional precedents, ever once re-
motely suggested that these state constitutional provisions
would be limited in any way by these states having recently
ratified the Constitution.55 Instead, instruction opponents simply
argued against the wisdom and propriety of binding federal
legislators.56 When they did-and this is the fourth point-they
often invoked arguments that can be used to distinguish be-
tween state and federal legislators for purposes of popular con-
trol. 57
Consider, in this regard, the powerful statement made by
Roger Sherman:
It appears to me, that the words [of the proposed instruction
clause] are calculated to mislead the people, by conveying an
of assembly and of petition, but does not protect the right of federal instruction).
53. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 735-46.
54. See, e.g., 1 id& at 744-45 (statements of Page and Burke).
55. Such a suggestion, if valid, would have been very relevant to the question at
hand. If state legislatures were free from instruction when performing duties created
by the federal Constitution, then no instruction of federal representatives would have
made sense, inasmuch as every one of their duties, indeed their very existence, is
owing to the federal Constitution.
One would think that if anyone believed that anything in the new Constitu-
tion-be it Article V or the Republican Guarantee Clause, see infra note 102-altered
the existing powers enjoyed by stats peoples over their legislatures, someone would
have mentioned such an important and likely controversial idea.
56. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 739 (statement of Stone).
57. See, e.g., 1 id at 735 (statement of Clymer).
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idea that they have a right to control the debates of the [na-
tional] Legislature. This cannot be- admitted to be just, be-
cause it would destroy the object of their meeting. I think,
when the people have chosen a representative, it is his duty
to meet others from the different parts of the Union, and con-
sult, and agree with them to such acts as are for the general
benefit of the whole community.58
Thus, to Sherman, a key reason for rejecting a right to in-
struct federal representatives was geographical. The Republic
was founded on the idea that different states and regions would
have different information, desires, values and interests, and
that Congress was designed to be a national body to which peo-
ple from all reaches of the country would come to exchange,
debate, and resolve ideas. Each congressional district or state
was a mere part of the national whole, and allowing each part of
the whole to instruct particular representatives destroyed the
very reason for having Congress "assemble" and hold "Meet-
ing[s]" as Article I of the Constitution requires.5 9
This idea that states or districts were only "parts" of the
"whole" and could not have all the relevant information that
comes from a "meeting" with other parts of the "Union" recurs
throughout the discussion of the failed instruction language.0
For our purposes, it also helps explain why instruction is per-
mitted at the state but not at the federal level as a general mat-
ter of federal constitutional law. As Madison argued in Federal-
ist 10 and 63, a truly deliberative government like the federal
58. 1 id. at 735 (emphases added).
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall assemble at least once in
every Year, and such Meeting shall be .... . (emphases added)).
60. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 738-39 (statement of Madi-
son); 1 id. at 742 (statement of Livermore); 1 id. at 746 (statement of Lawrence).
One scholar reflected on this idea, contrasting colonial instruction with the way
things worked in Parliament:
Instruction was but one form by which representation in the colonies was
kept "actual," a form of attorneyship, as distinct from the virtual repre-
sentation celebrated in Burke's description of Parliament as "a delibera-
tive assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole, where,
not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general
good, resulting from the general reason of the whole."
BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERIcAN POLITIcs 84-85 (1968) (quoting Edmund
Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol in 1774).
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Congress required the "extensive territory" that made up the
new Union."1 Madison observed that geographical units with
more "narrow limits," like those "occupied by the democracies of
Greece," could not be expected to have the model of "representa-
tive government" exemplified by Congress.62
This distinction between the geographically expansive federal
Union and the more "narrowly limited" states was woven into
the Constitution itself. Unlike Congress, state legislatures are
not required by the federal Constitution to "assemble" or hold
"meetings." Congresspersons necessarily come from different
geographic regions; Article I requires as a qualification for Con-
gress that candidates "be [ilnhabitant[s] of... [the] State[s]" in
which they are elected.6" By contrast, there is no federal consti-
tutional requirement that state legislatures be selected from
separate geographical districts within the state; certainly, a
state could choose to elect all its legislators through an at-large
system.64 Moreover, the division of geopolitical authority among
political subdivisions within a state is purely a matter of state
law.65 As far as the federal Constitution is concerned, the state
is the smallest part of the national whole-it is the constitution-
al quark. It is for these reasons that John Adams understood
intuitively that federal instruction posed different issues than
state legislative instruction:
Upon principle, I see no right in our Senate and House to
dictate, nor to advise, nor to request our representatives in
Congress. The right of the people to instruct their representa-
tives, is very dear to them, and will never be disputed by me.
But this [federal instruction] is a very different thing from an
interference of a State legislature.'
61. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 63 (James Madison).
62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 387 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
64. I argue below that the Constitution does not even mandate that state legis-
lative representative bodies exist in any form. Even if I am wrong about this, how-
ever, there is no plausible argument that state legislatures must mirror Congress.
65. See, e.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (observing that
states may delegate or withdraw power to local government in their "absolute discre-
tion.... In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legislative body, con-
forming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any
provision of the Constitution of the United States").
66. John Adams, Letter to J.B. Varnum, in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADABIS, supra
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Given this historical backdrop of state legislative instruction,
the textual argument from Article V against coercion of state
legislatures looks more questionable. If the Hawke Court was
correct that the term "Legislature" was "not a term of uncertain
meaning" 7 at the founding, that meaning cuts in favor of, and
not against, popular coercion of state legislatures. To put my
point another way, as a matter of text, Article V should take
"legislatures of the states" as it finds them-subject to control by
the people of the states.6" Indeed, it is not uncommon to find
discussions throughout the framing period in which the term
"legislature" is used interchangeably with "people." For example,
in describing the essence of republican government, Charles
Pinckney in the South Carolina ratifying convention explained
that a "republic [is a form of government] where the people at
large, either collectively or by representation, form the legisla-
ture."9 I do not mean to argue, of course, that the Framers did
not understand that there was an observable difference between
the people acting directly and through a legislative body.70 In-
stead, as Pinckney's words illustrate, what I am suggesting is
that a dominant mode of thought regarding the state govern-
ments in effect before ratification viewed legislatures as merely
alter egos of the people.
B. Structural Considerations
If the textual/historical argument against reading the phrase
"legislature" to mean "independent legislature" were not persua-
note 42, at 604, 605.
67. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920).
68. The Constitution incorporates other terms whose meaning is defined under
state law. For example, the term "property" in the Fifth Amendment is defined by
reference to expectations arising from state law. For a discussion of the Consti-
tution's incorporation of terms defined under state law, see Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575-78 (1972); Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct
Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1347, 1366-71 (1996).
69. 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 328.
70. Indeed, as we will see, there is a big difference in that legislatures may act
selfishly, and, for that reason, need to be monitored by the people. See infra notes
72-101 and accompanying text.
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sive enough, there are compelling structural and pragmatic
reasons as well.7 ' Most importantly, denying the right of the
people to coerce state legislatures would require us to read Arti-
cle V to give ordinary government complete control over changing
ordinary government. Such a reading is impossible to square
with the pervasive fear the Framers expressed about govern-
ment self-dealing and the right of the people to respond to such
self-dealing by altering their form of government.
1. Popular Sovereignty and the Agency Problem
The Constitution was founded on the legitimate power, or
sovereignty, of the people. This sovereignty meant first and
foremost that the people created government, not vice versa, and
that the people could therefore change government when appro-
priate. Throughout the debate over whether to alter America's
basic government by ratifying the Constitution, both proratifica-
tion federalists and antiratification antifederalists built their
arguments on this "transcendent and precious right of the peo-
ple to 'abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their safety and happiness .. ..'"' As James
Madison put the point to the delegates at Philadelphia, "[tihe
people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to
them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter constitutions
as they pleased."3
Indeed, the whole idea of building an amendment process into
the Constitution derived from a concern that the people would
need to reclaim some of the power they had delegated to their
everyday government agents in an orderly way. As James
Iredell, who would later serve with distinction on the Supreme
Court, explained at the North Carolina ratifying convention:
71. Of course, the structural arguments I present below are independent of each
other, and of the textual/historical arguments I presented above. One could embrace
any or all of them to agree with my conclusion.
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 253 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
73. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 476 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS] (statement of Madison) (emphasis added); see also 4
DEBATES, supra note 47, at 230 ("The same authority that created can destroy; and
the people may undoubtedly change the government .... " (statement of James
Iredell) (emphasis added)).
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[In America] tumultuous proceedings are as unnecessary as
they would be improper and ineffectual. Other means are in
our hands, as much preferable as good order is to confu-
sion... [Whenever the people want to change their constitu-
tion], it is entirely within their power to effect it without the
slightest disturbance.74
What is more, among leading federalists and antifederalists
alike, it was well understood that such constitutional change
often would be necessitated by government officials who abused
their power. Indeed, concern about what economists today call
"agency costs" was one of the most dominant themes running
through political discussion in the 1780s.75 In Federalist 63,
Madison succinctly distilled the concern in very simple but pow-
erful terms: "The people can never willfully betray their own
interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by the representa-
tives of the people ... 76 Linking together all these ideas of
popular sovereignty, betrayal by government agents, and the
need for an amendment process, Edmund Pendleton told the
Virginia Ratifying Convention over which he presided:
We, the people, possessing all power, form a government,
such as we think will secure happiness: and suppose, in
adopting this plan, we should be mistaken in the end; where
is the cause of alarm on that quarter? In the same plan we
point out an easy and quiet method of reforming what may
be found amiss. No, but, say gentlemen, we have put the
introduction of that method in the hands of our servants, who
will interrupt it from motives of self-interest. What then? ...
74. 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 232.
75. As many other constitutional scholars have demonstrated, this concern about
abusive and disloyal government agents animated much of structure of the original
Constitution, and a great deal of the Bill of Rights as well. See, e.g., AXHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998).
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 386 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by in-
trigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray
the interests of the people."). This is why, for example, state legislatures-which
were not to be trusted--could not ratify the original Constitution. Instead, the people
themselves had to ratify the original Constitution in special conventions. See infra
notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
2000] 1055
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVmW [Vol. 41:1037
Who shall dare to resist the people? No, we will assemble in
Convention; wholly recall our delegated powers, or reform
them so as to prevent such abuse; and punish those servants
who have perverted powers, designed for our happiness, to
their own emolument."
When the time came to spell out a particular amendment
procedure in Article V, no concern weighed more heavily on the
minds of the drafters than government selfishness. An early
version of what became Article V was roundly rejected because it
vested amendment authority in Congress alone, giving the na-
tional legislature in essence a veto over constitutional change:
"It would be improper to require the consent of the [National]
Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse
their consent on that very account. The opportunity for such an
abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling for
amendm[en]t."8
As Walter Dellinger wrote twenty years ago, this theme-Con-
gress ought not to have control over amendment process lest the
process be used to retain and aggrandize Congress's own pow-
ers-is one of the few that emerges quite clearly from the pro-
ceedings. 9
But concerns about self-dealing were not limited to Congress.
Just as those who crafted Article V explicitly rejected a congres-
sional block on changing the Constitution, so too they explicitly
rejected giving state governments a veto.80 Responding to anoth-
er early version of Article V that gave proposal power directly to
the legislatures of the states and not to Congress, Alexander
Hamilton objected: "The State legislatures will not apply for
alterations but with a view to increase their own powers.""1 This
concern was a serious one-so serious that the final version of
77. 3 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 37.
78. 1 RECORDS, supra note 73, at 203 (statement of Mason); see also THE FED-
ERALIST No. 85, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[It has
been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national govern-
ment will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which
they were once possessed."); Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the
"Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623, 1626, 1630 (1979).
79. See Dellinger, supra note 78, at 1630.
80. See id. at 1626-28.
81. 2 RECORDS, supra note 73, at 558.
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Article V not only denied state legislatures exclusive authority
to propose amendments, but also allowed Congress to cut state
legislatures out of the ratification process.82 Moreover, the final
version denied state legislatures any power to propose amend-
ments at all, instead giving states only the power to call for a
national convention. 3 Professor Dellinger has observed that this
proposing convention was attractive to the Framers because it
was a "national body." ' It seems quite natural that it was at-
tractive also because it was a nongovernmental body, and thus
was not prone to the selfishness of ordinary government.
So those crafting and discussing Article V in 1787 were wor-
ried Congress would act selfishly, and that state legislatures
would act selfishly. Were they also worried about Congress and
the state legislatures acting selfishly at once? The antifederalists
certainly were. Consider, for example, the analysis of Article V
by the Federal Farmer in October, 1787:
While power is in the hands of the people, or democratic part
of the community, more especially as at present, it is easy,
according to the general course of human affairs, for the few
influential men in the community, to obtain conventions,
alterations in government, and to persuade the common peo-
ple they may change for the better .... But when power is
once transferred from the many to the few, all changes be-
come extremely difficult; the government, in this case, being
beneficial to the few, they will be exceedingly artful and
adroit in preventing any measures which may lead to a
change; and nothing will produce it, but great exertions and
severe struggles on the part of the common people.'
The Federalists responded to charges like these by denying the
characterization of Article V as entrenching government. and
aristocratic interests. Quite telling are the remarks Rufus King
made at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, three months
after the Farmer's remarks:
82. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
83. See Dellinger, supra note 78, at 1632.
84. Id.
85. Letters from the Federal Farmer (V) (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 579 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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[Miany of the arguments of [constitutional opponents are]
founded on the idea of future amendments being impractica-
ble. [I] callI[ upon [these] gentlemen to produce an instance,
in any other national constitution, where the people had so
fair an opportunity to correct any abuse which might take
place in the future administration of the government under
it.
8 6
James Iredell was perhaps most thorough in responding to
criticisms of Article V, in his statements to the North Carolina
ratifying convention:
The Constitution before us, if it be adopted, can be altered
with as much regularity, and as little confusion, as any act of
[any] Assembly .... [Alterations can without difficulty be
made, agreeable to the general sense of the people. Let us
attend to the manner in which amendments may be made.
The proposition for amendments may arise from Congress
itself, when two thirds of both houses shall deem it neces-
sary. If they should not, and yet amendments be generally
wished for by the people, two thirds of the legislatures of the
different states may require a general convention for the pur-
pose, in which case Congress [sic] are under the necessity of
convening one. Any amendments which either Congress shall
propose, or which shall be proposed by such general conven-
tion, are afterwards to be submitted to the legislatures of the
different states, or conventions called for that purpose, as
Congress shall think proper.... By referring this business to
the legislatures, expense would be saved; and in general, it
may be presumed, [that] they would speak the genuine sense
of the people. It may, however, on some occasions, be better to
consult an immediate delegation for that special purpose. This
is therefore left discretionary.8 7
Iredell's passage is telling. The goal of the Article V amendment
process is to obtain amendments "agreeable to the general sense
86. 2 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 116 (statement of King) (emphasis added); see
also 2 id. (stating that there is no other government 'in which such a wise precau-
tion has been taken to secure to the people the right of making such alterations and
amendments, in a peaceable way, as experience shall have proved to be necessary"
(statement of Jarvis) (emphasis added)).
87. 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 177 (statement of Iredell) (emphases added).
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of the people," those that are "generally wished for by the peo-
ple," and those that reflect a "genuine sense of the people."88
Indeed, Iredell is explicit that if Congress fails to propose an
amendment that is wished for "by the people," the state legisla-
tive call for a proposing convention is the cure. 9 And while
Iredell's reference to congressional "flexibility" to circumvent
self-interest on the part of state legislatures specifically relates
to ratification, the concern underlying the "flexibility" applies to
calls for a proposing convention as well. 90
It is true, of course, that the Framers probably anticipated
that a healthy competition between state and federal govern-
ments would ensue, with each helping to keep selfishness on the
part of the other in check.91 This competition may have grown
less intense over the decades, partly because through federal
funding the federal government may have "tamed" state govern-
ments. Rotation of individuals from state to federal office also
may have broken down the competition.
But surely the Framers appreciated in 1787 that even with
fierce competition, certain kinds of potential federal amend-
ments could tempt all levels of government to betray the wishes
and interests of the people. Liability of government officials for
constitutional torts is one example. Pay raises for government
88. 4 id-
89. 4 id.
90. Nor would it be a good argument to suggest that the inclusion of the ratifying
convention route means the Framers assumed that the "legislature" route would
involve legislative independence. Not all states had an explicit right to instruct, and
although the people of each state retained the right to amend their state constitu-
tion to include such a device for control, the Framers quite sensibly did not want to
rely on the people of each state doing so at the ratification stage. I suppose the
Framers could have invoked the idea of state proposing conventions, but such propos-
ing conventions probably were not mentioned for two reasons. First, time may not
be of the essence at the proposing stage as it is at the ratification stage, and thus
the control the people of each state enjoyed over their legislatures would suffice.
Second, the Framers had no direct experience with state proposing conventions when
it came to the federal Constitution. Instead, they had experience with a national
proposing convention, which of course took place in Philadelphia, and ratifying con-
ventions in each state. I should note also that there may be additional reasons for
having conventions that go beyond the need to circumvent state legislative self-inter-
est.
91. For a discussion of the "competition" view of federalism, see infra notes 208-22
and accompanying text.
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officials is another because pay scales for one level of govern-
ment often are used as reference points for determining fair pay
for other levels. Term limits is yet a third example, for similar
reasons: The success of term limits at one level of government
may embolden and empower proponents of term limits at other
levels. It would be bizarre to think the Framers would not be
concerned with these kinds of possibilities and would want to
give ordinary government officials a monopoly on constitutional
change in these areas. Although federal antitrust laws were not
yet enacted, certainly the founding generation appreciated that
competitive organizations often conspire and collude with each
other for the greater goal of rent seeking.92
It is important to note that elections for government officials
do not solve the problem. Such elections, unlike debate over a
potential constitutional amendment, are not focused on a single
issue. Therefore, for example, even if an overwhelming majority
of voters in a state embraced federal term limits and did not like
the fact that their state legislature refused to apply for a consti-
tutional convention, voters in each state legislative district
would have to weigh that discontent along with a number of
other policy preferences in deciding whether to punish their
state representative. Worse still, because punishing an incum-
bent could cause voters in a state district to perhaps lose legisla-
tive seniority unless voters in other districts all across the state
were engaged in similar punishment, a "prisoners' dilemma"
makes regular elections even less useful.9 3
Let me be clear: Those who framed and ratified Article V no
doubt expected that state legislatures would exist and that most
of the time the people of each state would give their representa-
tive body some slack to consider federal constitutional amend-
92. Cf A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Constitutions and Spontaneous Orders:
A Response to Professor McGinnis, 77 N.C. L. REV. 537, 539 (1999) (indicating that
"state and federal government actors [often times] seek to collude over the allocation
of authority and revenues, maximizing each level's ability to distribute rent seeking
opportunities").
93. This is where devices like scarlet letters come into play, because they make it
more likely that voters in other districts will punish unresponsive incumbents there.
For a lengthier discussion of prisoners' dilemmas in the term limits context, see
Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 928-29
(1992).
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ments. Expecting some slack and mandating that such slack
exist as a federal constitutional matter, however, are very differ-
ent things. And whether we judge the matter from the perspec-
tive of the founding or now, the essential concern about govern-
mental self-dealing argues overwhelmingly against an interpre-
tation that gives government an absolute block on changing
government-particularly when it comes to something like term
limits.
All of this is especially true because the Supreme Court,94 as
well as the lower courts that have struck down scarlet letters,9 5
view Article V as the exclusive means to amending the Constitu-
tion. All the rhetoric quoted above about the right of the people,
as distinguished from government agents, to change their form
of government must mean something, and if it does not mean
amendment outside of Article V,96 then it must mean the right of
popular decision making within the confines of Article V.97 Be-
94. See, e.g., U.S. Term Lihnits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837-38 (1995)
(holding that Article V is the exclusive means of imposing congressional term limits).
95. See, e.g., Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1123 (8th Cir. 1999) ("The U.S. Con-
stitution provides ... exclusive means for its own amendment."); Donovan v. Priest,
931 S.W.2d 119, 128 (Ark. 1996) ("Article V of the United States Constitution [re-
quires] that all proposals of amendments to that Constitution" come exclusively
through the Article V processes); Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Cal.
1999) ("The United States Supreme Court has held that the means for amending the
federal Constitution set forth in Article V are exclusive and may not be modified by
state law.").
96. Of course, there are strong arguments that support the legality of a non-Arti-
cle V amendment process. For the foreseeable future, however, courts are unlikely to
embrace these arguments. A good survey and discussion of these arguments is found
in Amar, supra note 23.
97. Some, including Henry Monaghan, have read the rhetoric about the "people's"
right to alter and abolish as a "source of political authority" rather than a "mode of
exercise." Monaghan, supra note 23, at 129, 164-72. If I understand him correctly,
what he suggests is that the people need not have any actual power, so long as
those representatives who exercise power can trace their election to the people.
Whether or not this is a plausible reading of the rights of the people of the United
States to alter and abolish, it is completely unpersuasive as applied to the state
peoples. This is so because, as Monaghan himself points out, state constitutions in
1787 implemented popular sovereignty operationally, giving voters the rights of in-
struction and state constitutional amendment. See id. at 172. Thus, at least at the
state level, the popular sovereignty rhetoric was understood as more than a theory
about political authority. For this reason, Monaghan and others who defend Article
V exclusivity would do better to argue that Article V exclusivity is consistent with
the right of the people to alter and abolish precisely because the people of each
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cause we have explicitly rejected a Constitution that allows for
popular control of Congress," Article V's reference to state leg-
islatures is the only place for that popular control to be incorpo-
rated into the system to initiate constitutional change. The mere
likelihood that regular elections for government officials will, in
most cases, enable the people to effect constitutional change is
simply not enough. The theoretical (or not so theoretical) possi-
bility that newly elected legislature after newly elected legis-
lature might decide, upon taking office, that the proposed consti-
tutional amendment platform on which they ran and got elected
is no longer such a good idea 99 is impossible to square with the
absolute right the people have to alter their form of government
under our Constitution. 100
In pondering these points, we would do well to keep in mind
Justice Story's description of Article V as a "safety valve" in his
famous Commentaries:
In regard to the constitution of the United States, it is con-
fessedly a new experiment... Its framers were not bold or
rash enough to believe, or to pronounce, it to be perfect....
state can control their state legislatures. In other words, exclusivity proponents
should embrace-and not resist-my thesis here because it helps them resolve an
otherwise thorny problem.
98. See supra notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
99. George Nethercutt, a Republican representative from Washington, famously de-
feated then-Speaker of the House Tom Foley after pledging to serve only three
terms. The popular media recently has berated Nethercutt for breaking his promise
and deciding to run for a fourth term. See, e.g., Robert T. Nelson, Nethercutt Haunt-
ed by Term Vow, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at B1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MAJPAP File; Sam Howe Verhovek, Some Backtracking on Term Limits,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at A20; Edward Walsh, Term-Limit Pledges Are Coming
Due: Some Advocates May Run Again, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1999, at Al; George F.
Will, Terms Unlimited, WASH. POST, June 24, 1999, at A27.
100. Perhaps my point here can be seen more easily by considering the four ana-
lytic options from which we have to choose when it comes to Article V: (1) the peo-
ple control neither Congress nor the state legislatures; (2) the people control both
Congress and the state legislatures; (3) the people control Congress and not the
state legislatures; or (4) the people control the state legislatures and not Congress.
The first is inconsistent with the idea of popular sovereignty to alter the Constitu-
tion-a right the Framers repeatedly asserted as foundational. See supra notes 72-77
and accompanying text. The third is implausible in light of the historical record. Our
choice is then between the second and the fourth. Given the history and structure of
the document, the fourth seems best. Even if one were to embrace the second, how-
ever, the recent scarlet letter cases would still be decided wrongly.
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[Tihey knew, that time might develope many defects in its
arrangements, and many deficiencies in its powers.... They
knew the pride and jealousy of state power in confederacies;
and they wished to disarm them of their potency.... They
believed that the power of amendment was, if one may so
say, the safety valve to let off all temporary effervescences
and excitements; and the real effective instrument to control
and adjust the movements of the machinery, when out of
order, or in danger of self-destruction. 1
2. Federalism and the "What If No State Legislature Exists?"
Problem
The argument against popular control of legislatures in Arti-
cle V becomes even less plausible when we move from the theo-
retical level to the practical. What if a state did not have a legis-
lature? To be sure, the Framers expected state legislatures to
exist in roughly the same form we know them today, just as
they expected Article II executive department heads to exist.
The Constitution, however, does not require either.
The only contrary argument imaginable would be based on the
so-called Republican Guarantee Clause of Article V.1°2 Like
other scholars who recently have written on that Clause, I do
not read it as requiring representation. The term "republic" was
used throughout the founding era most often as a synonym for
majoritarian democracy, and not for representative govern-
ment.10 3 The clause certainly was designed to preserve forms of
state government that existed at the framing, which necessarily
included the right of the people to instruct."° Moreover, the
101. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1822 (New York, Da Capo Press 1833).
102. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government .... ").
103. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Govern-
ment: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994); William T. Mayton, Direct Democracy, Federalism and the
Guarantee Clause, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 269 (1999). These two pieces collect historical
evidence to refute the argument some have made, based on language in Federalist
Number 10, that a "republican guarantee" necessarily means representative filters.
104. See Mayton, supra note 103, at 270-72. If the Republican Guarantee Clause
called into question any aspect of existing state constitutions in 1787, certainly this
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clause was intended to allow states to "experiment by altering
these forms,... [s]ubject only to the condition that these choices
and experiments remain within the zone of popular sovereignty."" 5
Hamilton put the point this way in Federalist 21: "[The Clause]
could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitutions by
a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This
right would remain undiminished. The guaranty could only
operate against changes to be effected by violence.""°6 Indeed,
the power the people of a state have to structure their own gov-
ernment organizations and agendas in different ways, and to
experiment to find the structure that best accomplishes liberty
and happiness, is a central tenet of federalism that explains a
great number of important federalism decisions over the de-
cades.1 °7 As Laurence Tribe has suggested, "the real business of
preserving federalism [is] protecting the structure of state gov-
ernment from federal intrusion."08
would have been a major point of discussion and controversy.
105. Id. at 271.
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
107. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Coyle v. Smith, 221
U.S. 559 (1911) (upholding a 1910 Oklahoma law moving the state capital to Okla-
homa City despite a federal law purporting to condition Oklahoma's admission to the
Union on a proviso that the state capital remain at Guthrie until 1913). New York
is discussed infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
108. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 918 (3d ed. 2000). For
those persons who might be inclined to think the Republican Guarantee Clause in
any way prohibits popular coercion of state legislatures, two additional points war-
rant mention. First, virtually no one argues that all direct democracy is unconstitu-
tional, so that a distinction between exercise of the initiative power generally and
popular coercion must be found. If one is found, perhaps because exercise of the
initiative power, like permissible federal preemption, does not offend state legisla-
tures in the way coercion does, there is a second problem: Popular coercion of state
legislatures does not, most people would think, raise a federal constitutional problem
when state legislatures are coerced in matters of state law alone. For example, the
people of a state can, by initiative, constitutionally force their state legislature to
produce a state budget on time by depriving legislators of pay after a certain date if
they have not enacted a state spending plan. For purposes of the Republican Guar-
antee Clause, however, why would this coercion be any different than coercion in the
context of Article V? If the answer is that Article V uses the phrase "legislature,"
then the Republican Guarantee Clause has added nothing to the discussion, and we
are left with the historical understanding of the word "legislature" I described a bit
earlier.
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But if we interpreted the word "legislature" in Article V to
exclude people, then a state that chose to experiment by not
having a legislature for some period of time would be denied its
say on federal constitutional amendments. The Ohio Supreme
Court pointed out over eighty years ago that this would be an
odd dilemma indeed:
[Tihat each state has the sole and paramount right to deter-
mine what its Legislature shall be cannot now be disputed. It
is [a] matter of common knowledge that there is too much
petty continuous disturbance of state laws by the various
General Assemblies of the several states. Too many laws are
enacted, amended, and repealed without rhyme orreason ....
Suppose some one were to propose and the people were to
pass an amendment to the state Constitution providing for
the abolition of the General Assembly for a period of ten
years, during which time all laws should be proposed and
enacted by the people of the state through the initiative and
referendum.... [DIuring such period [would] the state 0 be
powerless to either favor or reject a proposed amendment to
the national Constitution, because it had no General Assem-
bly[?] Such an absurd situation disqualifying a state from
passing upon proposed amendments to the national constitu-
tion surely was never contemplated. 1°9
A possible rejoinder might be: "Well, there is no requirement
of a legislature, but if the people of a state choose to have one,
federal amendment is one thing they have got to give to it-a
nondiscrimination requirement of sorts." There is some language
in the most-cited United States Supreme Court case in the area,
Hawke v. Smith, that supports this view.11 In refusing to give
effect to the Ohio constitutional provision that authorized the
people of Ohio to annul by referendum a ratification of a federal
amendment effected by the legislature, the Court did observe
that Ohio, while retaining a referendum, had chosen to give
most legislative powers to a state legislature.' However, it is
hard to understand a nondiscrimination principle in terms of
109. Hawke v. Smith, 126 N.E. 400, 403-04 (Ohio 1919) (Wanamanker, J., concur-
ring), overruled by 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
110. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230-31.
111. See id. at 228-29.
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any underlying constitutional values that might be at work."
Moreover, such a principle would require the difficult if not
impossible task of determining whether a state really had a
legislature. In other words, how "general" does a body's legisla-
tive powers have to be in order that it qualify as a legislature?
What if a state creates a number of lawmaking bodies, and re-
serves to its people the most important lawmaking function?
Does it have to assign Article V duties to one of its representa-
tive bodies? If so, which one?"'
3. The "What About Recall Efforts?" Problem
Yet another line-drawing problem arises when we consider
how far courts are willing to push their rule against coercion of
state legislatures. In particular, consider that many state consti-
tutions explicitly provide the people of each of those states with
the power to recall their elected representatives before the next
regularly scheduled election." 4 Imagine that the people of a
state exercised the power to remove some or all of a state legis-
lature because the legislature failed to take some action-either
calling for a convention or ratifying a pending proposal-con-
cerning a federal constitutional amendment. Could a court, in
the name of Article V legislative independence, enjoin such a
recall effort?" 5 If not, imagine further that the people of the
state then replaced the vanquished legislature with one that
promptly followed the people's will by calling for the convention
112. If either of the two values analyzed in Part III, see infra notes 208-34 and ac-
companying text-filtration or preservation of states' rights-were at work, a non-
discrimination norm would seem underprotective as to its goal.
113. The language of the Ohio Supreme Court opinion in Hawke v. Smith is pro-
vocative here: "The Constitution of Ohio nowhere uses the word 'legislature,' and if
the strict letter of the law be applied, Ohio has no Legislature in the strict and
technical sense. Its Legislature is a 'General Assembly' plus the referendum in the
hands of the people." Hawke, 126 N.E. at 404 (Wanamaker, J., concurring).
114. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; GA. CONST.
art. 2, § 2, para. 4; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 8; see also supra note 43 (expanding on
the theme of legislative accountability to the electorate as enunciated in various
state constitutions).
115. The Court has held that at least some cases raising questions under the Arti-
cle V ratification process are justiciable. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386,
390-403 (1983).
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or ratifying the proposed amendment. Do the actions of the sec-
ond legislature count, or are they nullified by improper control
over Article V processes by the people?116 If the second leg-
islature's actions count, how do we distinguish actual recall
removal from instruction with the threat of removal?
To consider these questions, perhaps it would help to take a
broader view. We would all concede that state voters are free to
take the state legislature's stance on federal amendment(s) into
account when making decisions at regular elections, just as
people could for federal congresspersons at federal elections. Yet,
if election awareness is permissible, why are instruction and
recall not? A quick answer might lie in the distinction we draw
between election awareness on the one hand, and instruction
and recall on the other, in the congressional context; why not
draw the same distinction as to state legislatures? My response
is one I have already given above: Federal agents are intended
to deliberate nationally, whereas state entities are not.1 7 That is
why the people of a state can instruct state legislatures, but not
their federal representatives, on ordinary legislative matters.
To see the point from another angle, consider that the time
frame for congressional elections is spelled out expressly in the
Constitution118 and cannot be shortened by the people of any
state. By contrast, the time frame for state legislative elections
is not prescribed by the federal Constitution, and therefore state
elections can be very frequent. Indeed, at the founding, they
were often yearly."9 Suppose technology improves such that a
state chooses to hold its "regular" elections four times a year,
and the people of the state use these regular elections to impose
their will across the board, including in the federal amendment
context. Would anyone say that Article V is violated?
116. I am assuming, of course, that a court could discern the actual intent of the
electorate here. Cf Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating an initia-
tive measure because of the intent of the voters).
117. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
118. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be com-
posed of Members chosen every second Year . .. ."); id. § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen ..
for six Years.").
119. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 42, at 111-12; WOOD, supra note 41,
at 166-67.
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C. Other Settings in Which the Phrase "Legislature" Has Been
Used
1. Senate Elections
Sometimes interpretation of a phrase in the Constitution
benefits from a comparison of how similar language elsewhere in
the document has been understood. "Legislatures ... of the ...
States" are authorized by the Constitution to do a variety of
things, and although I do not pretend to touch on every place in
the Constitution that might be compared to Article V, a few
specific provisions deserve some attention. Most important are
the provisions in Article I regarding the election of United
States Senators.
The original Constitution, before passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1913, provided in Article I, Section 3 that the
"Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof .... . 0 Like
Article V, Article I, Section 3 textually makes the state legisla-
tures the actors; it is the "Legislature[s] thereof," and not the
"states" more generally, that shall do the "cho[osing]." 1
For the purposes of this discussion, I need not fully engage
the question whether, as an originalist matter, "legislatureP in
Article I, Section 3 was intended to mean "independent legisla-
ture."' Whether they were guaranteed it by the Constitution or
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
121. Id. Compare this language with Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, providing that
"[elach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,
[the state's electoral college] Electors." Id. art. H, § 2, c. 2 (emphases added). Al-
though Article II uses the term "legislature," it is not terribly relevant to my inquiry
because the subject of the sentence is the State itself. In any event, there is no in-
stance in which the people of a state have tried to coerce its state legislature to
pick the presidential electors who are most popular with the electorate; such a move
has been unnecessary, because by 1820 most states, and by 1865 all states, provided
by statute for popular election of presidential electors. For further discussion, see
Amar & Amar, supra note 93.
122. There may be some originalist support for this. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No.
45, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The Senate will be elected
absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures."). There is evidence cutting the
other way, however, so it is not clear that Article I, as originally written, did more
than authorize, as opposed to mandate, states to delegate United States Senator
selection to standing legislatures.
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not, state legislatures did enjoy independence in selecting their
preferred persons for the Senate for the first one hundred years
of the Republic.m But by the late nineteenth century, some
years before the formal enactment of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment providing for direct election,m4 state legislative indepen-
dence had broken down.
125
Throughout the 1890s and early 1900s, the people of various
states were devising more or less effective means of limiting
state legislators' discretion in their choice of federal senators. 1
26
What evolved into the most sophisticated approach, the so-called
Oregon Plan (or Scheme), began simply enough: State legislative
candidates in Oregon were given the opportunity to formally
pledge to follow the will of the voters, as expressed through an
advisory election, when it came time to pick the next federal
senator. 7 Initially, the pledges were moral only.18 As other
states began to follow Oregon's lead, however, more creative and
coercive devices were employed. Nebraska, in fact, pioneered
precisely the kind of scarlet letter system under attack today. 9
Other states followed suit, crafting variations on the Oregon and
Nebraska devices to suit their local needs.' Ultimately, Oregon
123. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 42, at 340; C.H. HOEBKE, THE ROAD TO
MASS DEMOCRACY 16-17, 84-85 (1995).
124. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be com-
posed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years ... .).
125. Several Commentators, have written about these events at some length. See
Amar, supra note 68; Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 CONsT.
COMMENTARY 201 (1996); Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth
Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 189 (1987); Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking Article V: Term
Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971 (1994).
Rather than trudge through the details in this Essay, I will summarize quickly the
historical developments and trust that interested readers will explore other more
historical accounts. For the most thorough of these accounts, see GEORGE H.
HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS (1906).
126. See Rotunda, supra note 125, at 206-09.
127. See HAYNES, supra note 125, at 101; Rotunda, supra note 128, at 208-09.
128. See Rotunda, supra note 125, at 208-09.
129. See HAYNES, supra note 125, at 103 (quoting Nebraska Laws § 253); Rotunda,
supra note 125, at 209.
130. See Rotunda, supra note 125, at 209; Kobach, supra note 125, at 1978-79 &
n.33.
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voters enacted a state constitutional amendment that, as a mat-
ter of state law, bound state legislators to select the United
States Senate candidates who were most popular among state
voters. 131 By 1912, when the Senate approved the Seventeenth
Amendment, nearly sixty percent of the senators were already
selected by virtual direct election." 2
Of course, the Nebraska scarlet letters and the Oregon consti-
tutional provision binding state legislators, as well as all the
copycat measures from other states, were never litigated in the
United States Supreme Court,"8 or lower courts for that matter.
That fact in itself may be telling. Moreover, any challenge to the
Oregon and Nebraska devices would have been difficult. If the
Oregon and Nebraska models were unconstitutional, that would
mean that all the senators elected from all the states that em-
ployed such devices for over a decade were illegitimate. The Su-
preme Court Justices and lower federal court judges who were
confirmed by these tainted senators were therefore also illegiti-
mate in some sense. Putting to one side the obvious point that
131. See Brooks, supra note 125, at 208.
132. See Rotunda, supra note 125, at 208-09.
133. The Supreme Court in Hawke, seven years after the enactment of the Seven-
teenth Amendment, observed that:
It was never suggested, so far as we are aware, that the purpose of
making the office of Senator elective by the people could be accomplished
by a referendum vote. The necessity of the [Seventeenth] amendment to
accomplish the purpose of popular election is shown in the adoption of
the amendment.
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 228 (1920). A determination in 1920 that the Oregon
Plan was unconstitutional would have sent shock waves through the country. More-
over, here (as elsewhere), the Hawke Court's reasoning is flawed. The Seventeenth
Amendment could have been enacted to clarify the people's (preexisting) power to
elect Senators. Clauses in the Constitution often are inserted for this clarifying ef-
fect. See Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1998) [hereinafter Amar, Constitutional Redundancies] (dis-
cussing the idea of redundancy as a tool for clarification). Moreover, the Seventeenth
Amendment could merely have changed the "default rule" from legislative to popular
election, even though the people of the state had always enjoyed the right to change
the earlier default rule on their own.
I myself have at times made the same error of logic committed by the Hawke
Court here. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to
Voting, 80 CoRNELL L. REV. 203, 223 (1995) [hereinafter Amar, Jury Service] (agree-
ing mistakenly with Justice Harlan's reasoning that enactment of the Fifteenth
Amendment by itself shows that voting was not covered by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
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there would be no judicial remedy for such illegality, I have a
tough time envisioning anyone in any of the three branches of
the federal government concluding that the entire federal regime
was ultra vires in this way for over a decade. Thus, this history
may be strong historical support for modern scarlet letter propo-
nents. 13
2. Other Uses of Similar Language
Two other places in the Constitution where "state legisla-
tures" are empowered warrant discussion. Article I, Section 4
allows the "Legislature" of each state to "prescribe" the "Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Repre-
sentatives .... .1 5 As I explain more fully below," 6 the Supreme
Court has held-and I completely agree-that this clause does
not prohibit a state constitution from vesting reapportionment
power in the people of a state acting through their referendum
and initiative powers.13 7 Thus, in this clause of the Constitution,
the term "legislature" of a state has not meant "independent
legislature." Finally, Article IV of the Constitution provides that
no new state shall be carved out of territory from existing states
"without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States con-
cerned .... . 8 I see absolutely no constitutional reason why
direct popular consent, or consent through a special convention,
would not suffice to cede state property validly.
Of course, even a devout "intratextuaist1 9 would acknowl-
edge that a single term like "state legislature" can mean differ-
ent things in the same document.' 4 For me, however, these
analogies, particularly the Oregon Plan story, are helpful ones
134. See Rotunda, supra note 125, at 210.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
136. See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
137. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
138. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
139. "Intratextualism" is a term used to describe the interpretive method by which
similar words or terms in the Constitution are analyzed by reference to each other.
See Akhii Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748-49, 788-95 (1999).
For an extensive example of intratextualism, see Amar, Jury Service, supra note 133.
140. For example, the term "person" may mean different things in different con-
stitutional contexts; corporations are persons for purposes of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though they are not persons for purposes of the
Census Clause.
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for a couple of reasons. To begin with, they refute the simplistic
textual argument that "legislature" has to mean "independent
legislature." Relatedly, and more importantly, because of the
structural concerns over self-dealing government agents I dis-
cussed at length above, Article V is the least likely candidate in
the Constitution for interpreting "legislature" to mean "indepen-
dent Legislature."14' Giving state legislatures absolute and non-
delegable control over the selection of United States senators
and the drawing of congressional district lines-matters of "ordi-
nary" government-would have been much more conceivable
than giving them control over federal amendments. Yet, in Arti-
cle I, we have read "legislature" in its limited sense-that is,
subject to whatever popular control state law sets up. 42 A forti-
ori, the same should be true for Article V.
II. A BETTER APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING "LEGISLATURE"
IN ARTICLE V
If the term "legislature" cannot, for the textual and structural
reasons identified above, mean "independent legislature," why is
it there? After all, the term "Legislatures... of the... States"
has to mean something, and are we not entitled to infer that
those who wrote and ratified the Constitution deliberately chose
that term over the more generic "state(s)," which is used exten-
sively elsewhere in the document? I think we are, and in the end
I do not think it is hard to see why Article V speaks in terms of
"legislatures." Begin by recalling James Iredell's ringing state-
ment in the North Carolina ratifying convention.' He spoke of
referring Article V matters to state legislatures to save "ex-
pense."' 4 As I acknowledged earlier, the Framers expected states
to have ordinary standing legislatures. It makes perfect sense
for the Framers to have wanted to take advantage of what were
likely to be existing institutions in each state to make the
amendment process as efficient as possible. Mason made this
suggestion when the topic of amendment first emerged at the
141. See supra notes 72-101 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
144. 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 177.
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Philadelphia Convention: "[lt will be better to provide for
[amendments] in an easy.., way ..... 145
A second, and more important, explanation for use of the term
"legislature" is also suggested by Iredell, as well as a number of
other prominent Framers, including Mason and Randolph.
Iredell expressed his happy belief that the Constitution could be
"altered with as much regularity, and as little confusion, as any
act of Assembly."1' Earlier, Mason had spoken in similar terms
of the need to "provide for [amendments] in [a] regular and Con-
stitutional way [in order to avoid] chance and violence."147 The
point here is that those who crafted Article V quite naturally
wanted to ensure that there was some smooth, orderly, and
uncontroversial way to handle proposal and ratification so that
disputes about the validity and legitimacy of newly enacted
amendments would be kept to a minimumY'4
This concern over uncertainty suggests that the term "Legisla-
tures ... of the... States" may well have been designed to
avoid confusion generated by a deadlock between a state's execu-
tive authority and its legislative authority. Article V is best
read, then, as preferring the state's supreme legislative authori-
ty whenever there is a dispute as to federal amendment. Under
this reading, a state can involve the people in the decisions
made by the legislature as long as doing so does not create con-
fusion as a matter of state law about who speaks in the name of
the state's supreme legislative authority in this realm. Another
entailment of this approach would be to view state legislatures
as the constitutional default: Unless and until state law speaks
definitively as to another superseding state authority, Article V
authorizes state legislatures, where they exist, to play an impor-
tant role in the amendment process. However, when a state has
clearly replaced that default with another republican, that is,
democratic, alternative, Article V is not offended.
145. 1 RECORDS, supra note .73, at 203 (statement of Mason); see also 3 DEBATES,
supra note 47, at 37 (statement of Pendleton) (referring to the amendment method
as "easy").
146. 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 177 (emphases added).
147. 1 RECORDS, supra note 73, at 203 (emphasis added).
148. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 37 (statement of Pendleton) (referring
to the amendment process as "quiet").
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Finally, Article V mentions "legislatures" simply to make clear
that states can, if they choose, delegate Article V power to ordi-
nary government representative bodies. In the absence of Article
V, state legislatures would have no constitutional amendment
role at all, and it would be questionable whether the people of a
state could participate in the constitutional amendment process
through a vehicle other than special conventions. 4 9 Remember,
the original Constitution was not, and consistent with federalist
political thought, could not have been ratified simply by the
ordinary legislatures of the thirteen states. 50 As George Mason
put the point: "[T]he authority of the people [is] ... essen-
tial .... The Legislatures have no power to ratify [the proposed
federal constitution]. They are the mere creatures of the state
Constitutions, and cannot be greater than their creators."'5 '
This "authorization" reading of Article V is perfectly consis-
tent with the "default" approach described above. Taken togeth-
er, they mean that the people of each state are free to influence,
indeed even coerce, Article V decisions so long as state law
speaks clearly. In the absence of a state deviation, however,
Article V presumes the legislature, should one exist, speaks for
the state. The "authorization" reading merely adds to the "de-
fault" reading the observation that, in the absence of a state
legislature default in Article V, the people of each state may not
have been able to delegate the power.
III. POTENTIAL COUNTERARGUMENTS
Let us now take up arguments that persons opposing my
thesis may assert. Because the lower court opinions that I criti-
149. See Amar, supra note 23, at 459.
150. See WOOD, supra note 41, at 532-35.
151. 2 RECORDS, supra note 73, at 88; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 252-53
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The proposed Constitution was to be
submitted to the people themselves . .. ." (emphasis added)); THE FEDERALIST No.
39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The Constitution is to be
founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America [and] derived from
the supreme authority in each State-the authority of the people themselves."); TE
FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("This arti-
cle [VII] speaks for itself. The express authority of the people alone could give due
validity to the Constitution." (emphasis added)).
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cize here make no historical or structural arguments and in-
stead rely exclusively on some old Supreme Court cases, I take
up these old cases first.152 I then posit some structural argu-
ments against my position that no one has advanced yet, but
that might be asserted as more attention is focused on this im-
portant issue.
A. Supreme Court Case Law
Far and away the most important case is Hawke v. Smith,'
decided in 1920. The Hawke decision is featured centrally in
each and every one of the recent rulings invalidating Article V
scarlet letters."M I squarely acknowledge that the broad lan-
guage from Hawke quoted in Part 1155 suggests that, at least at
the ratification stage, the word "legislature" in Article V does
not include the people. On the other hand, Hawke involved a
supplantation of the legislature by the people and not mere
coercion by the people to force the legislature to act.1 56 Much
more importantly, the broad language in Hawke was not neces-
sary to the result in that case. And there is other language in
the opinion that helps explain, in ways consistent with the read-
ing of Article V that I embrace here, why the case was decided
correctly and was, in fact, an easy call. 57
The facts of Hawke are rarely presented in modern cases
citing it,' 58 and indeed are not all apparent from the Supreme
152. See infra notes 153-207 and accompanying text.
153. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
154. See, e.g., Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 1999); League of
Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52, 56-57 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan v.
Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 125-27 (Ark. 1996); Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240, 1247-
49 (Cal. 1999).
155. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
156. This is the same textual point I made earlier, when I suggested that scarlet
letters comply with the technical terms of Article V because, whether coerced or not,
the legislature is doing the acting. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
157. Hawke may also be limited to the context of amendments proposed by Con-
gress, as distinguished from those generated by a proposing convention. The idea
would be that where Congress has proposed an amendment, it could attach certain
conditions on its ratification, such as ratification by "independent legislatures."
158. See, e.g., Miller, 169 F.3d at 1123-24; League of Women Voters, 966 F. Supp.
at 56-57; Donovan, 931 S.W.2d at 125-27.
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Court opinion itself. 59 But we cannot easily understand what is
at stake without appreciating the sequence of events.
On December 1, 1917, two-thirds of each house of Congress
adopted a resolution proposing and submitting for ratification
what ultimately became the Eighteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution-the alcohol prohibition amendment. 6 ' An important
feature of the resolution was its provision "that the Amendment
should be inoperative unless ratified" by the requisite number of
legislatures of the states "within seven years from the date of...
submission." 1' On January 7, 1919, the Senate and House of
Representatives of Ohio, acting as the General Assembly of the
state of Ohio, adopted a resolution ratifying the proposed prohi-
bition amendment and mandated that certified copies of the
joint resolution of ratification be forwarded by the governor of
Ohio to the United States secretary of state and to the presiding
officer of each house of Congress.'62 On January 27, 1919, the
governor of Ohio complied with the legislature's resolution."
Two days later, the secretary of state of the United States pro-
claimed that the Eighteenth Amendment had been ratified, list-
ing Ohio as one of the thirty-six states having ratified the
same.
1 64
On March 11, 1919,165 six weeks after the United States sec-
retary of state proclaimed ratification, a voter in Ohio filed with
defendant Harvey Smith, the secretary of state of Ohio, a refer-
endum petition pursuant to provisions in the Ohio Constitu-
tion.166 The petition, which had been signed by the requisite
number of voters, six percent, requested that Mr. Smith prepare
159. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 224-25 (1920).
160. The Eighteenth Amendment, which was repealed by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1, had "prohibit[ed] the manufacture, sale or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exporation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction
thereof for beverage purposes." Hawke, 253 U.S. at 224-25.
161. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 225.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See Petition in Common Pleas Court, Record at 16, Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S.
221 (1920) (No. 582).
166. See id. Record at 16-17.
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ballot materials for an election to be held by the people of Ohio
to approve or reject the alcohol prohibition amendment to the
United States Constitution.1 6 7 The 1918 Ohio Constitution "re-
serve[d] to [the people] themselves the legislative power of the
referendum on the action of the General Assembly ratifying any
proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United
States."'68 By its terms, the Ohio Constitution required that any
legislative ratification not go into effect "until ninety days after
it shall have been adopted by the General Assembly," during
which time signatures could be gathered and a referendum peti-
tion could be filed.'69
In April of 1919, plaintiff George Hawke brought suit in Ohio
county court to enjoin Smith from expending any state monies in
preparing and printing forms for the referendum ballot, on the
ground that such a referendum under these circumstances would
violate federal law.'70 The trial court, the state appellate court,
and the Ohio Supreme Court all rejected this claim, holding that
the referendum ballot could proceed.' 7'
The United States Supreme Court reversed, in effect refusing
to permit the Ohio Constitution's referendum provisions to be
implemented on these facts. 72 In doing so, the Court spoke in
the broad terms quoted earlier,173 essentially saying that a legis-
lature is a legislature, and not the people. In assessing this
language, we must bear in mind that courts--even the Supreme
Court-are part of the "ordinary government" about whom the
framers displayed distrust. There is an element of elitist anti-
populism'74 in the Hawke Court's tone that is difficult to square
167. See id. Record at 19.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. Record at 16-21.
171. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 224 (1920).
172. See id. at 231.
173. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
174. I see this elitism in the lower court opinions as well. As evidence of this elit-
ist bias, which plagues me and other law professors too, I should quickly add, con-
sider the California Supreme Court's treatment of the severability clause in the
invalidated Proposition 225. After concluding that the people of California had no
direct role to play in the Article V process, the California Supreme Court turned to
whether any portion of the initiative could be saved. See Bramberg v. Jones, 978
P.2d 1240, 1252 n.19 (Cal. 1999). I submit that it could be saved merely by excising
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with the historical and structural arguments I have advanced.
For these reasons, the passage is very unpersuasive.
Moreover, the Court's broad language was unnecessary to re-
solve the case before it because there was a much firmer ground
on which to do so, and one that the Court itself suggested. After
explaining that the Ohio referendum could not proceed, the
Court observed: "Any other view might lead to endless confusion
in the manner of ratification of [the] federal amendments."175
Now here is a concern that is rooted in the structure and history
of the Constitution itself. And the facts of the case implicate this
concern as powerfully as one could imagine. Let us not forget
that by the time the referendum petition was filed, the governor
of Ohio had already told the federal authorities that the legisla-
ture of Ohio had ratified the Eighteenth Amendment.176
Indeed, things were worse than that for the Ohio referendum
proponents. The United States secretary of state had already
references to "Article V" from Proposition 225. So construed, Proposition 225 merely
would have instructed the California legislature to make a non-Article V application
to Congress, communicating the will of the people of California concerning a federal
term limits amendment. True, under the court's reasoning, Congress would not have
had to "count" this application towards Article V's two-thirds threshold, but so what?
Such an application still might have had an effect on Congress--certainly more ef-
fect than disparate communications from individual constituents.
The California court's response to this option is brief but revealing. Citing to an
earlier case, which, of course, it has the power to overrule, the court observed:
"[I]nsofar as a provision of an initiative measure simply adopts a resolution calling
upon Congress to propose an amendment . . . , the measure 'does not create law
and thus . . . does not "adopt" a "statute" within the meaning of' [the voters' initia-
tive powers in the California Constitution]." Id (quoting AFL-CIO v. Eu, 686 P.2d
609, 628 (Cal. 1984)).
The problem I have with this reasoning is simple: Proposition 225, construed to
excise the "unconstitutional" references to Article V, does more than "adopt] a reso-
lution calling upon Congress," it imposes a statutory duty on the California legisla-
ture to take an act-to expend funds to make a non-Article V application on behalf
of the people of California for whatever it may be worth. A "resolution" by the peo-
ple is not quite the same thing as an "Application," even one that will not count for
Article V purposes, by the legislature on behalf of the people. For a variety of rea-
sons, the latter may have more impact. Surely if the people of California through
the initiative instructed the state legislature to expend funds on some other com-
municative activity, say antismoking ads, we would say that initiative "creates law."
It is far from clear to me why Proposition 225's obligations, though only directed to
the legislature, are not obligations arising from a "law."
175. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added).
176. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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proclaimed the validity of the new amendment. 1 7 Did anyone
really think the people of Ohio could reopen the validity of an
amendment already proclaimed by the federal government to be
the Supreme Law of the land? To put the point another way, by
ordering the governor to communicate ratification-apparently
in violation of the ninety-day waiting period 78-- the Ohio legisla-
ture effectively blocked the state referendum procedure from
being used. A very different case would have been presented,
however, had referendum proponents been able to get into court
to enforce the Ohio Constitution before legislative ratification
was communicated to Washington. Given the way things did in
fact happen, had the United States Supreme Court given effect
to the referendum provision, an immensely uncertain situation
would have resulted. In some ways, then, Hawke can be under-
stood to be more about the lack of remedies for state law breach-
es than it was about state law conflict with Article V. 7"
The Supreme Court even acknowledged much of this two
years later, in Leser v. Garnett,' when it affirmed the validity
of the Nineteenth Amendment over objections that various
states had improperly ratified the Amendment in violation of
state legislative procedures."' In dispensing with the challenge,
the Court explicitly relied on the ground that the governors of
the states in question had-whether or not they complied with
state law in doing so 82 -already certified to the federal govern-
177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
178. The governor communicated ratification to the United States secretary of state
20 days after the state legislature ratified the amendment. See supra notes 162-63
and accompanying text. This apparently violated Ohio's law because the Constitution
of Ohio mandated that no ratification "shall go into effect until ninety days after it
shall have been adopted by the General Assembly." Petition in Common Pleas Court,
Record at 19, Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (No. 582).
179. Cf 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 741 -(observing that "binding" in-
structions need not void the vote of faithless agents).
180. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
181. See id at 137. Plaintiffs in Leser also challenged ratification in some states on
the same ground unsuccessfully urged in Hawke-that violation of state referendum
laws made ratification ineffective. See id. On this point, the Leser Court merely cited
Hawke. See id.
182. The Leser Court explained that as long as the "legislatures . . . had power to
adopt the resolutions of ratification," their having done so was conclusive upon the
United States secretary of state. I& Of course, this reasoning really did not take
head on the plaintiff's argument that because the legislatures in question had vio-
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ment, and that certainty required respect for these certi-
fications." 3 This makes perfect sense. How could we expect fed-
eral executive and legislative officials, to whom notice of certifi-
cation by states is sent, to arbitrate disputes about what state
law means? One way to understand the reference to "legisla-
tures" in Article V, then, is to say that their communication to
Congress counts as "official"; but this does not mean that Article
V prevents state law from coercing state legislatures into com-
municating to the federal government the message that pleases
the people. Courts, like the California Supreme Court in the
Proposition 225 case,'14 are fully capable of enforcing this coer-
cion before the fact in ways that avoid confusion and uncertainty.
Given all this, to the extent that Leser adds anything,185 the
light it casts backward on Hawke might be a narrowing one.186
lated "rules of legislative procedure," they lacked "power." Id. In any event, for our
purposes, if violation of procedural rules in Leser does not deprive a state legislature
of power, then neither should violation of the referendum provisions at issue in
Hawke and at issue in another part of Leser have deprived the Ohio legislature of
its power. Ohio's certification to the federal government in Hawke, then, is "conclu-
sive" by the reasoning of Leser without regard to whether Ohio law violated Article V.
183. See id. (relying on Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669-73 (1892)).
184. See Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1999).
185. The precedential value of Leser is weakened by the fact that, as the Court
itself noted, the states whose ratification was in question were unnecessary to the
ultimate ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment inasmuch as enough other states
had already ratified it. See Leser, 258 U.S. at 137. One could argue, I suppose, that
because some of the unchallenged state ratifications took place after some of the
challenged state ratifications, those unchallenged subsequent ratifications may have
been improperly influenced by the earlier "illegal" ratifications being contested in
Leser. Perhaps it is for that reason the Court went on to discuss the merits of the
plaintiffs' claims that various ratifying states had violated state referendum and
state procedural rules.
186. Mike Paulsen has noted this aspect of Leser.
Of course, the state's transmission of its ratification should be one that
federal authorities may take at face value .... (The Court so held just
two years after Hawke, in Leser v. Garnett). It is thus the responsibility
of state authorities to enforce any state law procedural condition subse-
quent prior to transmittal ....
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V The Constitutional Lessons of
the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 732 (1993). Because of the opaci-
ty of the Hawke opinion, however, Professor Paulsen did not realize that Leser nar-
rowed Hawke and at the same time made its outcome correct. Accordingly, Professor
Paulsen suggests that Hawke was "wrongly decided." See id. at 731 ("On bal-
ance, . . . the [best thing to do] is simply to recognize that Hawke was wrongly
decided."). In a discussion with him, I think I have convinced Professor Paulsen that
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The other opinion involving the Supreme Court that often is
mentioned in the scarlet letter debates-though this time by
scarlet letter proponents-is Kimble v. Swackhamer,187 written
in 1978. Kimble was not a decision by the full Court. Rather, it
was an in-chambers opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist.18 Acting
in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit, he re-
fused to enjoin a Nevada law that called for a state popular
election to provide advice to the Nevada legislature on the ques-
tion of ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment.189 Obviously,
Swackhamer is a limited decision. First,, it involved only one
Justice."9 Second, it involved a purely advisory referendum that
had no legal or ballot designation ramifications. 9' Third, and no
one until the California Supreme Court in the Proposition 225
opinion had mentioned this, 192 " it involved input of the people
sought by the legislature rather than imposed by the people
themselves.193
There is one other Supreme Court case, decided a few terms
before Hawke, that I think is very important, Davis v.
Hildebrant,19 although no one else seems to talk about it. Davis
involved a challenge to popular involvement not in Article V, but
rather in Article I, Section 4, which, as I noted above, like Arti-
cle V uses the term state "legislature."195 Article I, Section 4,
Clause 1 provides in full: "The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Con-
gress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chosing Senators."' 9
Hawke has unnecessary and unpersuasive language, but is correct on its facts and
susceptible of a narrower reading consistent with its reference to "confusion."
187. 439 U.S. 1385 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978).
188. See id
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1386.
192. See Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Cal. 1999).
193. In other words, the advisory referendum was itself the product of a Nevada
legislative statute. See Kimble, 439 U.S. at 1386.
194. 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
195. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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The plaintiffs in Davis challenged another progressive feature
of the Ohio Constitution-the provision that empowered the
people of Ohio directly to engage in congressional redistricting
by the initiative and referendum process. 19 7 They argued, as do
challengers to today's scarlet letters, that "legislature" in Article
I, Section 4 means a representative body rather than the people
acting directly. 9 ' Accordingly, the plaintiffs argued, Ohio's redis-
tricting done by the people in 1916 did not have the force of
law.199
The Supreme Court rejected this challenge to redistricting by
referendum, relying on Congress's apparent tolerance of popular
participation.2 0° The Court noted that Congress, in an earlier
federal statute enacted in 1911, had inserted a clause that was
"plainly intended to provide that where by the state constitution
and laws the referendum was treated as part of the legislative
power, the power as thus constituted should be held and treated
to be the state legislative power for the purpose of creating con-
gressional districts by law."201 This congressional statement,
reasoned the Court, effectively cured any problem that otherwise
would exist.
2 02
At first blush, the Davis Court's approach seems reasonable
and not necessarily inconsistent with Hawke. After all, the tex-
tual grant of power to Congress in Article I, Section 4 does seem
to distinguish this clause from Article V, where Congress enjoys
no such broad discretion. 2" But a closer look at Davis reveals
that the reliance placed on the congressional Act becomes more
complicated and Davis becomes much more difficult to reconcile
with the broad statements in Hawke. Why? Because as a textual
matter-and Davis purports to be a textual decision relying on
the textual power Congress enjoys under Article I, Section
197. See Davis, 241 U.S. at 566-67.
198. See id. at 567.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 568-69.
201. Id. at 568.
202. See id. at 568-69.
203. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (allowing Congress to make or alter
regulations governing elections for senators and representatives), with id. art. V (pro-
scribing the specific proposal and ratification process for amendments).
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42 -Congress itself in 1911 did not "make or alter" any "regula-
tion." Instead, it merely created authority in states, subject only
to state law constraints, for them to make such regulations in
any way they wanted and to define "legislative power" for these
purposes to include the people. 0 5 That is precisely the way the
Court characterized the federal statute, both in Davis20 6 itself
and in the discussion of Davis in Hawke."' But if Congress is
not making any laws itself and is merely saying it thinks a defi-
nition of "legislature" for Article I, Section 4 that includes popu-
lar power is reasonable enough to permit state law flexibility,
why not the same for Article V? In the end, then, I think Davis
is in tension with a broad reading of Hawke, such that Hawke is
bracketed by two decisions, Davis before it and Leser after it,
both of which may counsel in favor of a narrower understanding
of the Hawke result.
B. Possible Structural Arguments Against Popular Input
There are two other kinds of arguments that, though not
articulated by any of the courts in this area, may lurk beneath
the results. I think neither of these arguments works on its own
terms, and certainly neither can overcome the structural and
historical arguments I have advanced above.
1. Competitive Federalism
The first set of structural arguments to consider are those
that have been invoked recently by the Court, in cases such as
New York v. United States, °8 to protect state legislative preroga-
204. See Davis, 241 U.S. at 569.
205. See id.
206. See id. ("[T]he referendum... should be held and treated to be the state
legislative power for the purpose of creating congressional districts by law." (empha-
ses added)).
207. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 230 (1920) (noting that in Davis, "Con-
gress had itself recognized the referendum as part of the legislative authority ...
(emphases added)).
208. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524
U.S. 206 (1998) (reviewing the applicability of the Federal Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 to a state prison system); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (applying the prohibition on commandeering to the Brady Act, a federal stat-
ute requiring state officials to make a reasonable effort to determine if certain pro-
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live against coercion from without-from the federal govern-
ment-rather than from within."9 On the view adopted in these
cases, one of the primary virtues of federalism is the creation of
two levels of government, each of which will keep the other in
check.210 The federal government watches over state govern-
ments and state governments blow the whistle on federal over-
reaching, with individual liberty and happiness being the benefi-
ciaries. In cases like New York,"' the Court worries about ac-
countability and monopolization-of-time problems that arise
when the federal government "commandeers" state legislatures
to do federal bidding."l In such a situation, state legislators may
get derailed improperly from their own business and may also
be improperly blamed for bad federal policies by the people, and
thus weakened in their eyes. Perhaps the crispest articulation of
this idea by the Court comes from Gregory v. Ashcroft,21 and
was repeated in the following form in New York:
[Tihe Constitution divides authority between federal and
state governments for the protection of individuals. State
sovereignty is not just an end in itself. Rather, federalism se-
cures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power. Just as the separation and independence of
the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front.214
The idea as applied to Article V would be that we should
interpret the amendment process to make it difficult to enact
spective firearm sales would be illegal).
209. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161.
210. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 921.
211. See Mathew P. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. 'REV. 71, 79 (observing that "tyranny
prevention" value "has figured most prominently in the recent case law" like New
York).
212. See New York, 505 U.S. at 169 ("Accountability is thus diminished when, due
to Federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the
view of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by Federal regulations.").
213. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
214. New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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amendments that have the effect of weakening state govern-
ment, and that state legislatures are best situated to appreciate
and safeguard the institutional interests of state government
against federal intrusion. Therefore, the amendment process
should involve, as much as possible, state legislatures rather
than the people, who may not have the experience (or selfish
incentives) to understand the importance of state governmen't.
It is true, as observed above, that Article V was animated by a
concern about selfish aggrandizement of federal powers, all of
which explains why Congress was not given a veto.1 5 However,
it is hard to leap from this observation to an affirmative grant of
any protection of state legislatures. Indeed, the text and struc-
ture of Article V seem to foreclose such a move. In particular,
under the straightforward terms of Article V, Congress can,
without input from state legislatures, propose a self-enhancing
amendment that, at Congress's direction, can be ratified not by
state legislatures but by state conventions.2 16 Because state
legislatures are not in control of conventions, which instead are
drawn from and answer directly to the people, 1 7 the federal
government-the chief rival of state government on this view of
federalism--can remain completely within Article V bounds and
yet promote amendments reducing state legislative power with-
out state legislatures having any formal input. 18 Article V sim-
ply does not guarantee that state legislatures are included in the
amendment process to protect themselves.
Now someone might respond by saying: "Precisely because
Congress has the power to propose whatever constitutional
amendments it wants in order to further its self-aggrandizing
agenda, we should read Article V to permit state legislatures
that same unfettered discretion in determining which amend-
ments they would like to have enacted. Ater all, if we are guid-
ed by a theory of federalism that emphasizes healthy competi-
tion, should not state legislatures have available to them what
215. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
216. This is true even if the amendment calls for a state to relinquish its propor-
tional representation in the House. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing "that no state,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate").
217. That is the whole point of a ratifying convention.
218. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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their competitor does?" The simple response to this is that the
words, structure, and history of Article V reject parity between
Congress and state legislatures. I just noted that Congress has
the unfettered power to propose. In contrast, state legislatures,
even if we read the term "legislatures" to mean "independent
legislatures," simply lack that power under Article V. Instead,
Article V provides only that state legislatures, or more specifi-
cally two-thirds of them, can force Congress to "call a Conven-
tion for proposing Amendments ... .2 1 9 This convention, in turn,
will have discretion220 whether to propose any amendments for
ratification at all. Indeed, the penultimate draft of Article V, as
Professor Dellinger has pointed out, would have given state
legislatures precisely the same power to propose amendments
and have them voted on as enjoyed by Congress. 221 But the
Framers rejected that version in favor of the final version that
deprives states of the power to propose.22
219. Id.
220. This is clear historically and textually. Because Congress is acknowledged to
have discretion in proposing, so too would a convention. Indeed, there has never
been a question about whether a convention would have discretion to propose or not
propose. There has been a debate on whether the convention can propose amend-
ments outside the scope of the applications of the states. See Dellinger, supra note
78, at 1636-38. I take no view on this, except to say that if there is such unfettered
discretion, it comes, as Charles Black suggested, from the nature of the term "Con-
vention to propose" itself, and the fact that the Convention in Philadelphia enjoyed
full discretion. See id. at 1624 n.5 (citing Charles Black, Amending the Constitution:
A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1972)). The argument for unbri-
dled convention power made by Walter Dellinger, see id. at 1630-31, resting on the
historical desire that state legislatures not be able to propose on their own, would
be completely addressed by a veto power on the part of the national convention and
does not require broad-ranging power to propose amendments unrelated to the issues
giving rise to the convention. Of course, under any reading, the convention would
have to enjoy the power to decide what "unrelated" means in this context.
221. See Dellinger, supra note 78, at 1625.
222. It is for these reasons that the Court has never included Article V in the
"political safeguards of federalism" theory that animates, for example, the Garcia
decision. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 &
n.1 (1985).
I should add that a competition can be healthy, even if both sides are not
armed identically. The simple fact is that no matter how we read Article V, Con-
gress and the states do not have identical sets of weapons in the federalism battle
for the hearts and minds of the people. There are a number of important respects
outside the federal amendment process in which Congress has more power to com-
pete. For example, it can preempt state lawmaking power by virtue of supremacy. It
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2. Filtration
The other structural argument that may be invoked to sup-
port reading the term "legislature" to mean "independent legisla-
ture" is grounded in filtration and deliberation. The notion here
is pretty simple: The Constitution in large measure reflects dis-
trust of passionate popular majorities, and the requirement of
independence on the part of state legislatures ensures that deci-
sions concerning federal amendment will be more thoughtful
and judicious.2"
There are a number of powerful responses. To begin with,
there is no historical evidence reflecting this deliberative view
of state legislatures in the Article V setting.2" Instead, the
Framers' analyses of Article V at the Philadelphia Convention,
in The Federalist Papers, and the state ratifying conventions use
is not hamstrung, because of the rejection of the "instruction" language proposed in
the First Amendment, by popular meddling in fashioning ordinary law. Everyone
concedes the permissibility of instruction of state legislatures in most everyday leg-
islative activities, but this means state legislatures may be less free to prove their
stuff, for example, by passing currently unpopular laws that look wise in a few
years, than is Congress. Yet this fact has not lead us to construe the Tenth Amend-
ment or anything else in the Constitution as interfering with the right of the people
to instruct their state legislatures as a general matter.
I do not mean to suggest that state government is less well armed than Con-
gress in all respects. Their proximity to the people might give them access and
credibility those inside the beltway lack. In any event, my point here is that the
competitive balance of federalism does not, and could not, require Congress and
state legislatures to be accorded identical treatment.
223. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315-16 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (warning against the danger of public passions in putting constitutional ques-
tions to a decision of the whole society).
224. Compare this with the "indirect" election of senators under Article I before the
Seventeenth Amendment and the selection of presidential electors under Article II.
For example, James Madison described the Senate election process under Article I as
having the advantage of "favoring a select appointment." THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at
377 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
In a similar vein, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 68 defended the presidential
election scheme in the following terms:
It was ... desirable that the immediate election [of the President]
should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted
to the station and acting under" circumstances favorable to deliberation,
and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which
were proper to govern their choice.
THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
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the terms "legislatures of the states" and "states" interchange-
ably and suggest, if anything, that state legislatures were to
mirror the people in the states.225 Nor is it surprising that there
is no discussion of state legislatures as "filters" here. Most im-
portantly, for the structural reasons I discussed above, state
legislatures were the last bodies appropriate to serve as fil-
ters.2 6 Recall yet again that when the original Constitution was
ratified, the Framers explicitly rejected state legislatures as
legitimate ratifiers because, as organs of ordinary government,
they were presumptively improper filters.
227
Moreover, it is not clear that the people acting directly need
any filters in the amendment context.228 The state ratifying "con-
ventions" that Article V authorizes Congress to choose may be
defined broadly enough to include popular democracy. In other
words, it might be that Congress can choose direct democracy as
a route to ratify proposed amendments. If this is so, then it is
not obvious why the people would be thought competent to ratify
but not competent to be involved in the proposal process.
Related to this notion, consider that at the time of the framing
the state of Rhode Island thought that a successful popular
referendum would have sufficed to ratify the original Constitu-
tion, even though Article VII of the Constitution refers only to
the "Ratification of the Conventions of ... States."229 Responding
to the objection that popular referendum would not have been
enough, Rhode Island's Governor Collins explained:
Although this state has been singular from her sister states
in the mode of collecting sentiments of the people upon the
Constitution, it was not done with the least design to give
any offence to the respectable body of those who composed
225. See, e.g., 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 177 (statement of Iredell) ("[State legis-
latures], it may be presumed, . . . will speak the genuine sense of the people."); see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 313-17 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing conventions for proposing amendments to the Constitution and arguing
that the legislatures reflected the will of the people).
226. See supra notes 72-101 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
228. Of course, a filter is not the same thing as deliberation. The latter may exist
through requirements of "cooling off" periods and multiple elections, without the
downside of the former.
229. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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the [Philadelphia] convention, or a disregard to the recom-
mendation of Congress, but upon pure republican principles,
founded upon that basis of all governments originally deriv-
ing from the body of the people at large.' 0
Finally, and in any event, the "filtration" argument collapses,
as did the federalism argument, under the weight of the struc-
ture of Article V itself. Put simply, concerns about filtration are
already addressed by the rest of Article V, no matter how we
read the word "legislature." Remember, when two-thirds of the
states apply, all that happens is Congress assembles a national
convention."' This national convention is a big, deliberative fil-
ter that completely satisfies concerns about hasty or passionate
changes in the Constitution.2 Indeed, it is a much more deliber-
ative filter than are the state legislatures. Like Congress, it is a
national body that allows delegates from each state to meet and
compare concerns. Additionally, because the proposing conven-
tion is a national entity that did not predate the Constitution,
it-just like Congress or the Philadelphia Convention that creat-
ed it--would not be amenable to instruction.23 For this reason,
it would have complete discretion to screen out passionate and
hasty amendments. If even further filtration were needed, it can
be found in the high supermajority requirements in Article V
230. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CmH. L.
REV. 475, 528 (1995); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 112 (1996) (indicating that Rhode
Island's actions were legitimate under legal principles of the founding).
231. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
232. If the deliberation concern is styled not in terms of unwise amendments, but
rather unwise failures to amend, there would be no justification for refusing popular
calls for a convention. At most, this argument would justify an independent power
on the part of state legislatures to make applications-not to block any.
233. In the same way, the electors of the so-called electoral college may be free
agents. I say "may" here because, on the one hand, the electoral college, like Con-
gress and an Article V proposing convention, is truly a national group whose exis-
tence owes entirely to the Constitution. On the other hand, the electoral college does
not "meet" and deliberate like Congress or an Article V proposing convention. The
question of whether electors can be "bound" and be punished for breaking pledges is
therefore an open one. Cf. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (finding that the
Twelfth Amendment does not demand absolute freedom for the presidential elector to
vote his own choice and that an Alabama Democratic Party pledge requirement was
not unconstitutional).
2000] 1089
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1037
and the time required to surmount such supermajority require-
ments.234
IV. THE QUESTION OF COERCING FEDERAL LEGISLATORS
Thus far, I have concentrated on coercive measures as applied
to state legislators. As has been implicit through much of my
discussion, the analysis is quite different with regard to federal
legislators. As I have explained at length,235 shortly after ratifi-
cation, language that would have included a right to instruct
Congress was proposed as part of the Bill of Rights and was
consciously rejected for sound reasons recounted above.236 This
episode, together with cases like Thornton23 7 and McCulloch v.
Maryland28 stand for the proposition that, unlike state legis-
latures, Congress is not an agent of people of the states for any
purpose.3 9 The people of a state cannot displace Congress or
preempt it by making law directly in the way they can displace
their state legislature.24 ° The people of the states do not pay
Congress's salaries the way they pay their state legislators'
salaries; the federal treasury does.241 Additionally, the people of
the states cannot recall Congresspersons. In all respects, Con-
gress is a federal institution and Congresspersons wear only one
hat-a federal hat.
Moreover, as to the House of Representatives, there may be
another problem with scarlet letters and other coercive devices.
Federal statutes require that House members be elected by
district and not by all the voters in a state.24" These federal
234. See, e.g., 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES app. at 371-72
(1803), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSITUTION, supra note 85, at 583; see also
3 STORY, supra note 101, § 1824 (discussing the Article V amendment process and
concluding that the "guards ...against the too hasty exercise of the power . ..are
apparently sufficient").
235. See supra notes 45-66 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
237. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); see supra notes 5-16
and accompanying text.
238. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
239. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 803; McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 328.
240. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 798; McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 328.
241. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
242. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994).
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statutes trump inconsistent state law by virtue of the Su-
premacy Clause.2"3 Thus, any instruction by the people of a state
as a whole to individual House members, even if unproblematic
on other grounds, might violate federal statutes.
Also, any attempt to enforce scarlet letters and other coercive
devices might, if taken too far, run afoul of Thornton itself to the
extent that such efforts may be seen as adding qualifications for
federal office beyond those in the Constitution. 2 Finally, any
scarlet letter devices as to federal incumbents certainly could be
undone by Congress through its Article I, Section 4 power to
"make or alter" laws governing congressional elections.245 Of
course, such congressional action may be difficult politically.
CONCLUSION
Having disposed of the problem raised by federal instructions,
let us now turn back one last time to popular control of state
legislators, and to the scarlet letter device itself. To say that the
Article V reasoning of the recent decisions has been shoddy is
not to approve of each and every scarlet letter device that has
been challenged. I recognize that scarlet letters and other coer-
cive devices may raise important constitutional questions that
have nothing to do with the use of the word "legislature" in Ar-
ticle V.246 These interesting questions must await further consid-
243. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
244. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 800-01.
245. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
246. A meaningful analysis of these other concerns requires consideration of many
factors which I shall be examining in another article. For now, by way of an appe-
tizer, let me quickly and tentatively flag just three of the many possible residual
concerns some people may have about scarlet letters.
First, and somewhat ironically in light of the discussion so far, I would be wor-
ried if a scarlet letter device originated from the legislature itself, rather than from
the people through the voter initiative. For example, if a majority of legislators want
to stigmatize those individuals who will not go along with some popular program by
a notation at the next election, I begin to worry about improper entrenchment. See
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY MD DISTRUST (1980). Second, I wonder how easy it is
to decide whether a legislator has disregarded voter instructions such that the ballot
notation is triggered. The more discretionary the task of identifying faithless legisla-
tors, the more I worry about who is doing the identifying and how the person or
entity is doing. it. Third, I worry about what the ballot designation itself says, and
whether the designation could be misleading or inflammatory. For example, would it
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eration. But that is all right-it is always nice to have some-
thing exciting to look forward to.
be constitutional to require a ballot notation of "PROMOTES RACIST POLICIES" for
any legislator who voted in the previous session for any race conscious remedial
program? There may be special concerns about voter deception that counsel in favor
of judicial scrutiny of proposed ballot designations. To be sure, notations of political
party identity can be misleading, but they seem different in kind. Cf Rotunda, su-
pra note 125, at 210. Moreover, is it so clear that government could impose a party
identification next to the name of a candidate on the ballot who would rather not
have one?
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